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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
R. VERNE McCULLOUGH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF COMMISSION-
ERS OF THE UTAH STATE 
BAR, 
No. 6101 
Defendant. 
REVIEW OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS OF THE BOARD OF COMMIS-
SIONERS OF THE UTAH STATE BAR, IN RE 
R. VERNE McCULLOUGH, No. F. 19 
PLAINTIFFS BRIEF 
Charges set forth in the complaint, No. F. 19, Par-
agraph III, subdivisions (a), (b), (c), (h), (i), (j), and 
(k), were not sustained by either the Disciplinary Com-
mittee composed of LeRoy B. Young, Royal J. Douglas 
and Stuart P. Dobbs, or the Board of Commissioners of 
the Utah State Bar. 
Charges set forth in Paragraph III, subdivision (g) 
were not sustained by said Disciplinary Committee who 
heard and received the evidence in the case but the Find-
ings of this Committee were reversed by the said Board 
of Commissioners without any additional evidence of-
fered or received by them. 
Charges set forth in Paragraph III, subdivision (d), 
(e), (f), (l) and (m), were sustained in whole or in part 
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by said Disciplinary Committee and said Board of Corn-
missioners as the Findings of Fact of these respective 
boards will show. 
Plaintiff will treat the sustained charges under 
three heads, namely : W underli (d), ~Woodland (e) and 
York (f) as No. I; Sutfin (g) as No. II and Harry Er-
ickson (1) and (rn) as No. III. The evidence submitted 
for and against these charges is abstracted and reviewed 
herein to assist your Honorable Court to cull out from 
approximately 2000 pages of evidence requiring more 
than 40 days to present before courts and other trib-
unals, material matters vital to the issues herein. 
NO. I 
(Subdivisions ( d)-Wunderli, (e)-Woodland, and 
(f)-York.) 
In these allegations, R. Verne McCullough is charg-
ed with soliciting employment through one Sid Spencer. 
The factual testimony is as follows: 
Subd. (d)-
FRITZ WUNDERLI, witness for the prose-
cution: 
288 Direct Examination: I am one of the oper-
ators of the Beau Brummel Cafe. On the 11th of 
January, 1934, my wife, Blanche vVunderli, and 
I were riding in an automobile which collided with 
a Union Pacific train drawn by a gasoline motor 
car. I was not injured but my wife was and she 
was taken to the Emergency Hospital. The next 
morning, January 12, 1934, a person carne to my 
3 
residence who said his name was Sid Spencer. 
Q. Do you have any recollection of what he 
looked like? 
A. Oh, I only know he was taller than I, and 
290 younger. That is all I can remember. 
This person introduced himself and then gave 
291 us a card similar to Exhibit "C." 
Q. Now, after this card was handed to you, 
Mr. vVunderli, what, if anything was said? 
(Accused objects to conversation as incom-
petent, irrelevant, immaterial and hearsay. Ob-
290-1 jection overruled on statement of counsel it would 
be properly connected up.) 
A. Yes, he said he was in with Mr. Verne Mc-
Cullough, and asked me if I knew him, and I said; 
''No,'' and he said he would like to take the case. 
292 That is about the conversation we had together ... 
Q. Did he have any documents there with him 
that he presented to you for your signature, or 
your wife's signature? 
A. No. 
Q. He did not 1 
A. No. 
Q. Did you see this man Spencer again? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you do any business with him there 
that day? 
292 A. No. 
Cross Examination by Mr. McC~tllough: About 
three or four months ago Mr. McCullough came to 
4 
the Cafe and Mr. Glaus, my partner, brought him 
293 out to the kitchen. I told Mr. McCullough at that 
time that the person who came to my home about 
our case was a neighbor in Highland Park and 
that I did not remember his name. 
Q. When I asked you about it, didn't you 
state to me that the only thing you knew about 
this person was that he was a neighbor, living at 
Highland Park, and that you did not remember 
294 his name 1 
A. Well, at that time I guess I didn't remem-
ber it any more. 
Q. Who put it in your head about this situa-
tion of getting a card with that name on it, "Sid 
Spencer~'' 
A. That affidavit-
Q. When did you sign that affidavit~ 
A. At the time of the accident-! guess about 
a month after. No, it didn't take that long. A 
few weeks after the accident. 
Q. And who prepared the affidavit~ 
A. Oh, some fellow from the Union Pacific 
office. 
Q. And he prepared the affidavit and had you 
sign iU 
A. Yes. 
Q. And m the affidavit he stated that Sid 
Spencer had come to your home 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when I talked to you about it you had 
5 
forgotten about the statement m the affidavit, 
hadn't you? 
A. No, not in the affidavit. I knew about it. 
Q. You had forgotten the name? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You could not give me a description of 
him the day I was in the cafe, could you? 
A. No. I can't now. 
Q. Was he light or dark complexioned? 
A. I would not know. 
Q. You would not know? 
295 A. No. 
Q. That is the only incident, or the only thing 
that was done at that particular time-he just 
came in and said that he was in with Mr. Mc-
Cullough, and he would like to take the case? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And then he never came back again? 
A. I never seen him. 
296 Q. He did not offer you any contract to sign? 
A. No, not that morning, no. 
Q. If you never saw him after that, he could 
not have offered it to you after that, could he? He 
never offered you any contract any other time? 
A. No; I haven't seen him. 
I was very much surprised to learn the iden-
tity of Verne McCullough. I thought he was a 
much larger and older man. I never talked with 
Mr. McCullough or had any personal dealings 
with him. The name on the card that I received 
6 
from this person who said he was Mr. Spencer 
was "United Claims Adjustment Bureau." I gave 
the card to Mr. Goodnow, the Union Pacific Claim 
298 Agent, when I signed the affidavit on January 23, 
1934. I have never seen the man since who came 
299 to my place and said he was Sid Spencer. This 
man did not ask me to sign any contract or any-
thing of that kind. 
The accused moved to strike all the witness' 
testimony as incompetent, irrelevant and imma-
301 terial. Motion denied. 
Subd. (d)-
BLANCHE WUNDERLI, a witness for the pro-
secution: 
Direct Examination: I am the wife of Fritz 
Wunderli. On January 11, 1934, I was injured 
in an accident in a collision between a Union Pa-
cific car and the automobile in which I was riding. 
I live at 1482 Stratford Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
302 Utah. 
The next day a man came to my house who 
said he was Sid Spencer. He handed us a card 
similar to Exhibit "C." 
303 I had the following eonversation with this 
man who gave his name as Sid Spencer: 
(Same objection as interposed to Fritz \Vun-
derli's testimony. Overruled 303). 
A. He asked us all about the accident, and 
just about what extent that the injuries came to, 
and he said something like this : ''Why not let us 
7 
handle this case for you~" And he says, "You 
know you might just as well make some money out 
of this, because there may be injuries that you 
have now that won't show up until later on. You 
might just as well get some money out of it." I 
think that is about the main things he said. 
304 When this man introduced himself he handed 
us the card and said he was with McCullough. He 
did not tell me McCullough was a lawyer. The 
next afternoon he called me on the telephone and 
said: 
A. He asked how I was, and I told him I was 
all right, there was no injuries that I knew any-
thing about. And he said, "Well," he said, "have 
you decided what to do about-about letting us 
handle your case 1 '' I said, ''No. My husband is 
in town, and we have not decided yet.'' 
Q. Anything else said at that time? 
305 A. No, I don't-! could not remember any-
thing else. 
I did not ask him nor did he tell me how he 
learned of our accident. He was rather tall, med-
ium complexioned, clear skinned, peppy in his 
nature and gracious in his manners. 
Cross Examinat,ion: I have never talked to 
Mr. McCullough at any time about my case against 
the railroad. The claim agent for the railroad who 
presented the affidavit paid us $115 as the ad-
308 justment of our claim. The following statement 
is in the affidavit I signed: 
8 
''That the said Sid Spencer did not ask her 
to sign a contract, or say how much money he 
could recover for her, but if she did decide to give 
309 him the case, to come to his office or call him.'' 
I did not mention anything in the affidavit 
about injuries which might appear hereafter. I 
just thought of that now. Mr. Thomas suggested 
310 I refresh my memory since I was subpoenaed. Mr. 
Thomas brought me the affidavit from the rail-
312 road company to refresh my memory. 
Defendant's affidavit marked Exhibit 11 re-
ceived in evidence as part of the cross examina-
312 tion of witness. 
Subd. (d)-
R. VERNE McCULLOUGH, witness for the 
defense. 
Direct Examination: I did not authorize, em-
power or talk to Mr. Sid Spencer about soliciting 
the case of Mr. Fritz VVunderli and Blanche Wun-
derli, his wife, relative to their accident which oc-
curred January 11, 1934. I knew nothing about 
the incident until it was called to my attention in 
the latter part of the year 1937 when the prelim-
inary charges were submitted to me by Mr. Mit-
788 chell, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Tingey. I then called 
on Mr. Glaus of the Beau Brummel Cafe who was 
a partner of Mr. Wunderli. Mr. Wunderli was 
working in the kitchen. Mr. Wunderli did not 
know who I was and stated that he had never 
talked with me about this accident at any time. 
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That I had never been in his home and that he 
had never been in my office. He was very sur-
prised to learn that I was Verne McCullough as 
he thought McCullough was a much larger fellow 
and a big shot around town. I asked him why he 
had signed an affidavit to the effect that I had 
solicited his business. He stated a neighbor in 
Highland Park had recommended that Verne Mc-
Cullough handle his case. He said he did not re-
member the neighbor's name; that he lived in 
Highland Park was all the information he could 
give me. He could not describe the person who 
made the recommendation that he get Verne Mc-
Cullough to handle his case. I never knew Mr. 
790 Spencer had any connection with this case what-
soever. He was never authorized to solicit the 
case for me at any time. 
Subd. (e)-
W. T. ~WOODLAND, a witness for the prose-
187 cution. 
Direct Examination: My address is 210 North 
State Street. I had an automobile accident on Oc-
tober 23, 1933. At that time I resided at 252 Al-
mond Street. After the accident I was first taken 
to the Emergency Hospital for about one and one-
half hours and then the police took me home. The 
next afternoon I was taken to the L.D.S. Hospital. 
188 I was in the hospital between three and four weeks. 
The morning after the accident a person called at 
10 
our home and said his name was Spencer. I do not 
remember his first name. 
189 Q. ~What, if anything, did you say to him~ 
(The accused objects-immaterial, incompe-
tent and irrelevant. Same ruling heretofore made 
in \Vunderli case.) 
A. That there conversation now is a pretty 
hard thing for me to say exactly what it was. 
Q. Tell us about it to the best of your memory. 
A. Well, he-first-when he first came in-I 
can't remember exactly-but he was there in the 
interest of my accident, and what I understood he 
was there to take the case. I know that I asked 
him the question if he was a lawyer, and finally 
he says, ''No.'' And, in the first place, I thought 
he was the man-the way I had it in my head, he 
190 was the man that was representing the insurance 
company. That is the way I got it in my head to 
start with. And then he finally told me, and what 
I understand, he told me he was there in the in-
terest of other lawyers or of the lawyer. 
Q. And did he mention who that lawyer was~ 
A. As far as I remember he mentioned Mc-
Cullough, and I remember that name more than 
I do the other name, if he mentioned it. 
Q. Do you remember that he mentioned the 
name of McCullough~ 
A. Yes, he mentioned the name of McCul-
lough, as I remember. 
11 
Q. And did he mention the name of any other 
lawyed 
A. vV ell now, I wouldn't swear to that, wheth-
er he did or did not. 
Q. I see. 
A. I wouldn't swear to it. 
Q. What did he say about Mr. McCullough~ 
MR. DOBBS: You say he mentioned Mr. Mc-
Cullough's name more than that of any other law-
yer. Had you some other lawyer's name in your 
mind when you made the answed 
190 A. Well, I have heard this other man's name 
-Spence, as near as I-
Q. Spencer~ 
A. I have heard his name, and it might be 
that I heard that there. 
MR. HANSEN : Spence or Spencer~ 
A. Well, I get that mixed up. 
MR. HANSEN: Was the other lawyer's name 
Spence~ 
A. Spence was his name. As far as I am con-
cerned on this thing I might be mixed up on it 
some because my doctor told me I had lost enough 
blood when I was in the Emergency Hospital to 
kill most any man, and when I was there-I can 
remember lots more about the accident than I can 
when I was in bed. 
Q. Now, what did he say with respect to Mr. 
McCullough~ 
A. I can't remember what he said about Mr. 
12 
McCullough or the other lawyers. I could not do 
191 that and be truthful about it. 
I never saw Mr. Spencer after that morning. 
193 I remember that I signed a paper. 
Q. Now, Mr. Woodland, what was that paper, 
if you know~ 
A. Well, I will tell you-I can't tell you a 
thing that was in it. That is one thing I cannot 
do. I cannot remember a word that is in it. He 
read it to me, but still I cannot remember it. 
Q. Did Mr. Spencer say anything to you about 
what the paper was~ 
A. I know he read it over to me, and I signed 
it. 
Q. You don't recall what was in iU 
A. I can't remember-I can't recall a thing 
193 that was in this paper." .... 
MR. YOUNG: Did he tell you what the pur-
pose of the paper was? 
A. Well, the purpose of the paper was-what 
I understood-was to enter suit against the com-
pany for this accident, in the first place ... 
194 Q. Did Mr. Spencer say to you who was to 
enter the suiU 
A. No, I can't say that he did. It seems to me 
like I remember that he said this was a prelimin-
ary, or something like that. He came back after-
wards and seen my wife afterwards about the 
194 thing. 
On October 26, 1933, I gave a statement to the 
13 
194 agent of an insurance company concerning this 
incident. (Over the objection of the accused the 
witness was shown statement he signed for the 
195 insurance agent and read the same to refresh his 
memory. The witness then testified to a long am-
biguous and unintelligible conversation, contained 
on pages 197-8 in which he said Mr. Spencer told 
him he was not a lawyer but mentioned two law-
yers named McCullough and Spence.) 
199 I never saw Mr. McCullough at any time until 
yesterday (Tuesday, July 12, 1938). 
In answer to the question as to whether he 
knew Benjamin Spence, the lawyer, the witness 
said: 
A. No, I don't. I will tell you this whole thing 
was kind of blurred to me at that time, and as far 
as I am concerned in this thing there might be a 
lot of things that I may say now that might not 
be exactly right because I can't remember exactly. 
200 I got a faint idea and that has kind of left me. 
MR. DOBBS: You were not in condition to 
have a very good recollection left in your mem-
200 ory~ 
I did not have any law suit. I settled with the 
insurance company myself. Speaking of the state-
ment in the affidavit he gave to the insurance 
agent, the witness testified: 
A. Yes. One thing I would like to say: When 
this document was made up, this here man (insur-
ance adjuster) said, "This is for nothing at all, but 
14 
202 just to relieve us of any suit, or anything that 
might come up afterwards, and this paper will 
never be shown.'' And I have often wondered how 
you fellows got hold of this-because he told me 
absolutely-I told him I didn't want anything like 
this to come up, and I didn't know it was going 
to come up, but he said, "It will never be used 
for anything else." That is what he told me. 
MR. YOUNG: Are you put out about it1 
A. Why, yes, I was kind of put out about it. 
I felt kind of bad about it, because I might have 
done it in a different way. I might have had the 
thing weighed heavier-maybe not on this partic-
ular accident, and I might have considered the 
thing more if I had thought it was coming up for 
202 this purpose. 
(Judge Hansen moved to strike the entire 
202 testimony of the witness.) 
MR. YOUNG: Unless there is some further 
connection, I am inclined to think probably the 
committee would agree with you, but if there is 
another witness, I think probably we should re-
203 serve it until we hear her testimony. 
MR. DOUGLAS: Perhaps it will be well to 
reserve your right, and we will skip along and we 
203 won't have to bother unless it is connected. 
C'ross Examination: I have a son by the name 
of Phillip who told me that he knew Mr. Spencer. 
I have never seen Mr. McCullough in my life until 
204 yesterday (July 12, 1938). I have never talked 
15 
with Mr. McCullough about my accident. I have 
never been in his office and he has had nothing 
to do with my case whatsoever. The statement I 
signed about the Spencer incident for the insur-
ance company was in the handwriting of the in-
204 surance adjuster. I am positive that Mr. Spencer 
said he was not a lawyer, notwithstanding my af-
fidavit states that Mr. Spencer said that he was 
205 an attorney. Mr. Spencer never told me anything 
like that. At the time I settled with the insurance 
adjuster, Mr. Abbott, he told me he wanted a 
statement that would protect them by settling with 
me personally without bringing Mr. Spencer into 
205 the case. The insurance adjuster did not give me 
or my wife a copy of the statement. Mr. Spencer 
never came back to see me. I do not know Mr. 
Callister. I have never seen him in my life. I have 
never had any connection with the law firm of Mc-
206-7 Cullough & Callister. Mr. Spenc.er was a tall man 
207 and dark complexioned. The only thing I can re-
member about him was that he was tall and dark 
207 complexioned and about thirty years old. 
Subd. (e)-
MRS. LYDIA WOODLAND, a witness for 
209 the prosecution. 
Direct Examination: I am the wife of W. T. 
Woodland, who was injured in an accident on the 
23rd of October, 1933. The next morning after the 
accident a man came to my door and asked if this 
was where Mr. W ooland lived and if he could see 
16 
him. I took this man into the bedroom. He was 
fair faced, light complexioned and about as tall as 
211 Mr. Thomas. He had a conversation with my hus-
band in the bedroom. I cannot tell you exactly 
what the conversation was as I was busy running 
between the bedroom door and the bathroom door 
to get the wash basin to clean my husband up. 
This man had a paper and on the bottom of the 
paper was the name "S" "Spencer." I do not 
recall what the middle initial was. It was beau-
tifully written. 
There was something on this paper saying 
something about a suit, or "You might have half, 
or nothing; if you have nothing you don't have to 
212 pay anything,'' and that is as much as I recall, 
213 and I don't just recall what else was in the paper. 
(The accused objected to witness' conversa-
tion as hearsay. Overruled.) 
Whether the names of McCullough and Cal-
lister were mentioned there or not, I don't know. 
After being instructed by Mr. Dobbs and Mr. 
Young as to whether she had any recollection as 
to any names being there at all, the witness an-
swered: 
A. I am sure the man came in, and I am sure 
he was standing over the bed in this fashion, with 
a paper in his hand, and I am sure I saw this name 
, 
written at the bottom, as I said, and I am sure my 
husband said, "Well, what do you think?" and 
I says-I don't remember whether I says: "I don't 
17 
213 know,'' or not. I don't recall what I answered. 
This man came to my house the next day. 
Q. And do you recall what he said to you at 
that timef 
A. He came to the door, and I just don't re-
collect whether he gave his name or not, but I re-
member he came inside. I must have invited him 
in, and then inside he had a paper in his hand, 
214 and he said, "I came about this suit," but I didn't 
see a thing that was on the paper at that time. He 
was nervous. As I remember, he trembled, sort 
of, and I said, "Well, there isn't any suit." He 
said, "But you have started suit." I says, "No, 
we haven't. How can you go on with a suit if we 
don't want any suitf" That is all that was done. 
He went. 
Q. Now, he didn't come back any more, and 
you didn't see anything more of him f 
Q. Mrs. Woodland, did you see Mr. McCul-
lough at that timef 
215 A. No. 
The first time I saw Mr. McCullough was 
about a week ago. It was after I got my subpoena. 
Or ass Examination: After I got my subpoena 
I requested friends of mine, Mr. and Mrs. Clayton, 
216 to have Mr. McCullough come and see me. I told 
Mr. McCullough that after this man came to see 
my husband the day after the accident that about 
an hour after he had gone, an attorney had come 
and left his card. I do not recall his name. This 
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attorney was officing in the Kearns Building. I 
216 have not been able to find the card. The contract 
or the paper I saw this man reading to my hus-
band the morning after the accident contained on-
217 ly the name of Spencer. I cannot recall the name 
of McCullough and Callister or McCullough being 
on the paper at all. This man never left any card 
217 but the attorney who came about an hour after 
he had gone, left me a card and the card showed 
he was officing in the Kearns Building. The per-
son's name on the card was not McCullough and 
was not Callister. I told Mr. Thomas about that 
218 person and tried to find the card but I had mis-
laid it. 
(At this time accused renewed the motion to 
strike the entire testimony of Mr. W. T. \Vood-
land on the ground it was immaterial and irrele-
vant and that the testimony of Mrs. vV. T. Wood-
land had in nowise connected up the testimony of 
her husband in any way with Mr. R. Verne Mc-
Cullough. Mr. Young indicated that the motion 
203 should be granted unless Mrs. Woodland's testi-
mony was sufficient to connect Mr. McCullough 
with the incident. The motions taken under ad-
220 visement.) 
Subd. (e)-
R. VERNE McCULLOUGH, a witness for the 
defense. 
Direct Examination: I do not know anything 
about Mr. Sid Spencer interviewing Mr. and Mrs. 
19 
W. T. Woodland about an automobile accident 
which occurred October 23, 1933. This matter was 
790 called to my attention for the first time by the 
special committee in the latter part of the year 
1937. I never met Mr. Woodland in my life until 
I saw him up here at the hearing. I met Mrs. 
Woodland about two weeks before the hearing at 
her home when she requested a mutual friend, 
Mrs. Alma Clayton, to have me call and see her. I 
never saw any instrument or document signed by 
Mr. Woodland in connection with the matter. When 
I called on Mrs. -woodland she told me that the 
only name that was signed on the statement be-
sides that of her husband was "Spencer." She 
said she did not remember the name of McCul-
lough or Callister ever appearing on the paper. 
She told me there was a lawyer in the Kearns 
building who came to see her about an hour after 
Mr. Spencer had been there and gave her his card, 
792 but she had misplaced the card. She said this law-
yer was not Mr. McCullough nor Mr. Callister. 
I did not employ Mr. Spencer to solicit that case 
and knew nothing about the matter until it was 
called to my attention over four years after it 
happened by the special committee. I never au-
thorized Mr. Spencer to represent me and I doubt 
very much if he did. 
Subd. (f)-
CLARENCE YORK, a witness for the pro-
secution. 
1..' 
'!l'.'i 
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'
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Dir.ect Examination: I reside at Orem, Utah. 
164 I was in a railroad crossing accident at Midvale, 
Utah, in October of 1931. Shirley Erickson, Oren 
Swenson, Naomi Gooen and Louise Christensen 
were also in the accident. Sid Spencer came down 
165 to Orem to see me four or five days after the ac-
cident. He said he was out in behalf of the law 
firm of McCullough and Callister of Salt Lake 
City; that he had been out and taken pictures and 
measurements of the accident and that he wanted 
us to turn our case over to the law firm. I signed 
166 a contract at that time. I did not keep a copy of 
it. The contract gave the law firm the right to 
proceed with our case. I do not ren1;ember the 
167-8 name of McCullough and Callister in the. contract. 
Shirley Erickson, Oren Swenson and myself met 
at the Erickson house. We all signed the same con-
tract on the same piece of paper. About a month 
after the accident Mr. Spencer took the three of 
us up to McCullough's office. Mr. Spencer intro-
duced us to Mr. McCullough. The witness then 
testified as follows: 
A. He introduced us and we talked about the 
accident, just how it happened, and all. 
Q. Whom did you talk to about it? 
A. With Mr. McCullough. 
169 Q. How long were you in Mr. McCullough's 
office~ 
A. Oh, I don't remember exactly-half or 
three quarters of an hour. 
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Q. Was there any dism~ssion had at that time 
with respect to the contract you had signed? 
A. No sir. 
Q. What was the discussion at that time, do 
you recall~ 
A. The discussion at that time was how it 
happened, and so forth. 
Q. Was there any discussion at all with re-
spect to Mr. McCullough handling the case~ 
A. Well, we naturally assumed he was. 
Q. I know --- but was there any discussion 
about it~ 
A. Well, he was asking about how it happen-
ed, and all, yes. 
Q. Did he ask you anything about your pay-
ing him for it, or anything of that sort? 
A. No. 
Q. Who was present at that time, Mr. York~ 
A. Shirley Ericksen and Oren Swenson and 
myself, and Sid Spencer. 
Q. And Mr. McCullough was there, wasn't he~ 
A. Yes, Mr. McCullough. 
Q. Now, did you ever go to court on your 
case? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Did you ever get any money out of your 
case~ 
170 A. Yes sir, one hundred dollars. 
Cross Examination: When we went to M c-
Cullough's office we did not sign anything at all. 
il,, 
i 1 '1' 
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Q. Did you ever sign a statement at any time, 
about how this accident occurred? 
A. Yes-with McKinney from the Railroad 
Company. 
Q. Anyone else besides McKinney~ 
A. No sir .... 
Q. Never signed one for McCullough and Cal-
173 lister-is that right~ ... 
A. There was the one with the railroad, and 
the one that Sid Spencer brought down to Orem. 
Q. And those were the only ones you ever 
signed 1 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You are certain about thaH 
174 A. Yes sir. 
The matter of an employment contract was 
not suggested or discussed at all with McCullough 
in his office. 
177 I was not consulted about the settlement at 
all. They settled without my consent. The settle-
178 ment was not satisfactory to me. We agreed to 
pay one-third. The settlement check was $150. 
179 I endorsed it and accepted a $100 check. I am a 
barber by trade. I never told Mr. McCullough that 
I was not satisfied with the settlement. I never 
180 discussed the terms of the contract with Mr. Mc-
Cullough in his office. The chief purpose we had 
in going to his office was just to relate how the 
181 accident happened. Louise Christensen signed the 
same contract that we (York, Swenson and Erick-
23 
son) signed at Erickson's home at Orem. I re-
member Elmo Christensen came down with Mr. 
Spencer at that time. I had forgotten about him. 
They, Elmo Christensen and Spencer, told me that 
Mr. McCullough was repres.enting Louise Chris-
181 tensen. At that time I did not sign a statement of 
182 how the accident occurred. 
(Statement marked "Defendant's Exhibit 4" 
shown to witness York.) 
182 The witness said, "That is my signature." 
(The witness reads statement.) That statement 
183 is a true account of how the accident occurred. I 
do not recall where I signed it. 
(Defendant's Exhibit '' 5,'' check issued to 
186 York, received in evidence.) 
Subd. (f)-
SOREN C. CHRISTENSEN, a witness on 
behalf of defendant. 
222 Direct Examination: I reside at Moroni, Utah. 
I have a daughter by the name of Louise Christen-
sen Erickson who is now married to Shirley Erick-
son. My daughter was injured in a railroad acci-
dent on Sunday evening, October 11, 1931. Clar-
ence York was driving the automobile which col-
lided with the D. & R. G. train at Midvale, Utah. 
The next day Mr. Kinney, the adjuster for the 
railroad company came to the home where I was 
224 staying and offered me $250 to settle the case. In 
the afternoon of that day I went to the office of 
R. Verne McCullough. Mr. McCullough was re-
24 
commended to me by Mrs. Michaels, my daugh-
ter's landlady, a Mr. Draper, who formerly lived 
in Moroni and was then living in Salt Lake City, 
224-5 and a Mrs. Calder. On Tuesday, October 13, 1931, 
my daughter and I signed the contract with Mr. 
McCullough. We were the only persons who sign-
ed this contract. Three boys were riding in the 
car at the time of the accident. Clarence York 
was the driver and Shirley :BJrickson and Oren 
Swenson were passengers in the car. On W ednes-
day, the 14th day of October, 1931, these three boys 
came to a place where I was staying in Salt Lake 
City and I told them that I had decided to engag:e 
Mr. McCullough as our attorney to take care of 
my daughter's case and the boys told me they in-
tended to support the girl by all means and in as 
much as we had engaged Mr. McCullough they felt 
like they would engage him for their part of the 
226 affair too. Clarence Y ark said at that time that in-
asmuch as we had engaged McC1J,llough as our at-
torney that he felt like it was better that the rest 
o,f them engage McCullough to handle the case al-
228 together. I had not seen or talked with Sid Spen-
cer up to this time. Thursday, the 14th of October, 
1931, I went up the second time to McCullough's 
office with my son. Mr. McCullough sent Mr. 
226 Spencer with my son to investigate the facts in 
the case. I have been the Justice of the Peace at 
228 Moroni, Utah. 
Cross Examination: I went to Mr. McCul-
25 
lough's office after I talked with Mrs. Michaels 
229 and Mr. Draper. It was on the 7th floor of the 
Judge Building. The name on the door was Mc-
Cullough and Callister. I do not recall Sid Spen-
229 cer's name being on the door. I think I signed the 
written contract on my second visit to McCul-
lough's office when my son was with me. I met 
Mr. Spencer at the General Hospital after I had 
been to Mr. McCullough's office the first time. 
231 My understanding was that Mr. Spencer was en-
gaged by Mr. McCullough to investigate and get the 
233 evidence in the case. Mr. Spencer introduced him-
236 self and said he was working with Mr. McCullough 
233 on the case, but he did not ask me anything about 
it at that time. Mr. Spencer did not say anything 
234 about Mr. McCullough's ability as a lawyer. Mr. 
Spencer did not say that Mr. McCullough was par-
ticularly resourceful in that kind of a law suit. 
235 That is what Mrs. Calder said. Mr. Spencer did 
not show me any card similar to Exhibit ''C.'' 
Q. Now, you told us about this conversation 
down here where those three boys were present. 
Do you recaii positively that Mr. York stated that 
he was going to engage Mr. McCullough 1 
A. They, all three boys-
Q. I didn't ask about the three-I asked you 
about Mr. York. 
A. Well, Mr. Y ark said, like the rest of them, 
inasmuch as he made this remark first, that he 
was the driver of the car, and they were anxious 
to see my daughter get justice-and he says, "Inr 
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asmuch as you are engaging Mr. McCullough--he 
237 felt like they would all engage Mr. McCullough." 
Mr. McCullough at no time made a statement 
to me that he would like to get the rest of the 
cases. Mr. Spencer is quite tall, a well built man 
and has fair complexion. He has a rather light 
skin. He had a pleasant demeanor and was very 
much a gentleman. He looked like he had been 
237-8 an athlete. 
Upon examination by Mr. Young the witness 
testified as follows : 
Q. Mr. Christensen, how did you come to meet 
Mr. Spencer at the hospital? 
A. I could not say-only I think he was go-
ing with Mr. Kinney, the railroad adjuster, when 
I met him. What his business was there, I could 
not-
Q. What did he say to you when he met you 
239 there at the hospital, do you recall~ 
A. No. 
Q. Did he tell you his name? 
A. He introduced himself. 
Q. Did he tell you whether someone had sent 
him there to see you? 
A. No sir. He just told me that he had-that 
he was engaged with Mr. McCullough in collect-
ing evidence in cases of that nature, and I think 
he stated that he had come to see about the girl-
her condition-in tbe hospital. 
27 
Q. When was that with respect to the time 
you spoke to Mr. McCullough first1 
A. The time that I met Mr. Spencer was about 
a day after I had been to Mr. McCullough's office. 
Q. About a day afted 
240 A. Yes. 
Examination by Mr. Douglas: 
The first time I talked with Mr. Spencer at 
the hospital I did not discuss the facts surround-
242 ing my daughter's accident. I signed the contract 
in Mr. McCullough's office in the presence of my 
son. My daughter signed the contract at the hos-
pital. 
Redirect Examination: 
My daughter got a copy of the contract. 
243 At the time I first talked with Mr. McCul-
lough, and before the formal contract was signed, 
I understood that he was to proceed with the case. 
The witness testified as follows: 
Q. Was there anything said at that particular 
time, or do you recall anything said about the in-
vestigation~ 
A. No sir; nothing any more than-there was 
nothing said about the investigation, only I gave 
you the idea that we would very likely engage you 
to handle the case, and, of course, my understand-
ing was that you would proceed from that on until 
at least-calculate that you were getting the case. 
Q. In other words, you gave me the impres-
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sion, in that conversation, that I was to go ahead 
with the case~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. There isn't any question about that, Is 
there~ 
A. No sir. 
MR. DOUGLAS: That was decided. 
244 A. Yes. 
I think it was Friday the 16th of October, 1931 
or probably Saturday the 17th, that my son went 
out with Mr. Spencer to, Orem to interview these 
witnesses, Clarence York, Shirley Erickson and 
245 Oren Swenson. 
The County physicians were handling my 
daughter's case. I was dissatisfied with their 
treatment and Mr. McCullough recommended Dr. 
A. Cyril Callister, an abdominal surgeon to take 
care of my daughter as she had four fractures of 
248-9 the pelvis. The understanding was that if Mr. Mc-
Cullough collected from the railroad company my 
daughter would pay Dr. Callister, and if she did 
250 not, she had nothing to pay with and could not pay. 
Subd. (f)-
LOUISE ERICKSON, a witness for the de-
fense. 
Direct Examination: I am the wife of Shirley 
Erickson. My maiden name was Louise Christen-
sen. I was in the crossing accident at Midvale, 
Utah, when the car in which I was riding collided 
with the Denver and Rio Grande railroad train on 
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275 October 11, 1931. Mr. York was driving the auto-
mobile. After the accident I was taken to the Salt 
Lake County General Hospital. I stayed there un-
til the following Saturday, when I was taken to 
the home of Katherine Michael, 475 Second East. 
I had pelvis fractures, a fractured hip and internal 
276 injuries and bruises. 
I never had any conversation with Mr. Sid 
Spencer at the General Hospital. I talked with 
him the first time down at Mrs. Michael's home. 
On Tuesday, following· the accident my father talk-
277 ed with me about employing Mr. McCullough and 
I told him to do as he saw best. I signed an agree-
ment at the hospital for Mr. McCullorugh to handle 
my case. Mr. Spencer was not there at that time. 
A copy of the contract was given to me and I have 
it at my home. I filed suit in my case and it was 
settled by Mr. McCullough for approximately 
278 $4500. I did not see Mr. Spencer until a week 
after the accident. He took a statement of my ver-
sion of the accident three or four days after I got 
back to Mrs. Michael's. 
Q. Did he (Mr. Spencer) attempt, at any 
time, to get you to say anything that was not ab-
solutely accurate, about this case 1 
A. No sir. 
Q. Did Mr. Spencer at any time in your entir,e 
experience in this particular case, ever ask you, or 
talk to you about employing me? 
279 A. No. 
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Q. Did he make any mention about employ-
ment, as far as I was concerned? 
280 A. No, he did no,t; he never mentioned that. 
Cross Examination: Mr. McCullough did not 
tell me that Mr. York intended to sue me for $500. 
He never made such a statement. Mr. McCullough 
at no time told me that Mr. York was going to 
bring a suit against me to recover part of the 
281 money that I received from the railroad. The first 
time I saw Mr. Spencer was down at Mrs. Mich-
ael's home. I signed a typewritten statement of 
the facts regarding the accident for Mr. Spencer 
at Mrs. Michael's home about two weeks after the 
282-3 accident. Mr. Spencer had statements of the other 
people who were in the automobile, giving their 
version of how the accident occurred. My father 
283 came to the hospital with a contract to emplo,y Mr. 
284 McCullough and I signed it at the hospital. I do 
not remember the date. I do not remember seeing 
Mr. Kinney, the railroad claim adjuster at the 
hospital. I have never met Mr. Kinney . .I paid 
Dr. Callister at the time I received my settlement 
from the railroad. The check was made out to me 
285 and Dr. Callister for $110 and I endorsed the 
check. The settlement with the railroad company 
286 was consummated in Mr. McCullough's office. My 
287 father made the arrangements to employ Dr. Cal-
lister. 
288 (Defendant's Exhibit No. "10," check given 
to Dr. Callister.) 
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Subd. (f)-
SHIRLEY ERICKSON, a witness for the de-
fense. 
Direct Examination: I live at Guadalupe, Cal-
ifornia. October 1931 I lived at Orem, Utah. My 
wife's name is Louise Christensen Erickson. I 
was in the crossing accident on October 11, 1931, 
at Midvale, Utah, with my wife Louise, Clarence 
York, Oren Swenson and a young lady by the 
252 name of Gooen. The first time I discussed with 
the occupants of the car about the employment of 
a lawyer was up at Mrs. Michael's place when we 
talked to Mr. Boren C. Christensen and Mr. Chris-
tensen told us that he had employed Mr. M cCul-
lough and we all decided we would stick together 
253-4 and have the same lawyer. I had not seen Mr. 
Spencer up to this time. A few days after that 
conversation Mr. Spencer came down to my home 
at Orem with Elmo Christensen, the son of Soren 
C. Christensen, and talked with Clarence York, 
Oren Swenson and myself. 
Q. Who was present in your home at the time 
he came down~ 
A. Why, I think all of us fellows met over 
to my place. 
Q. Who were the fellows that met~ 
A. Clarence Y o,rk and Oren Swenson and my-
self. 
Q. What did Mr. Spencer do at that time~ 
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A. Well, he just took the notes of the accident 
as we told him. 
Q. How did he take those notes, if you recallf 
A. Well, he just wrote it down on a piece of 
paper. 
Q. Did he use a typewriter, or longhand, or 
whaU 
A. He just used longhand. 
Q. After he got this-did he interview you, or 
anybody separately? 
A. No; altogether. 
Q. Did you all give a separate version of the 
case? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. After he wrote the notes down did you sign 
the notes that he had 7 
254 A. Yes, I think we signed the notes .... 
Q. Did Mr. Spencer, at amy time during that 
conversation ever ask you, or anybody, any of the 
o,thers to sign a contract to employ me? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Did you sign a contract at that time, that 
Mr. Spencer handed you, to employ me? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Did you see any of the others szgn any 
contract? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did Mr. Spencer, in your presence, and in 
the presence of those people, while you wer.e there, 
mention anything about a contract to employ me? 
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255 A. No sir. 
Q. I will ask you, Mr. Erickson, if Mr. Spen-
cer at any time, ever asked you, or made any in-
timation whatsoever about your coming to me, and 
employing me as your attorney? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Let me call your attention agatn to the 
time that the two other boys and yourself were 
down at your house, two or three days after the 
accident. I think you said somewhere around the 
latter part of the week of the 11th, did you see any 
co,ntracts exhibited to any of those boys, or did 
260 you see them sign a contract at that time? 
A. No. There was none signed. 
Q. Was ther,e anything signed except the long-
hand notes which Mr. Spencer took from you 
there? 
261 A. That was all. 
About Christmas time Mr. York, Mr. Swen-
son and myself went to Mr. McCullough's office 
255-6 to see what Mr. McCullough could do for us. We 
signed some typewritten copies of the longhand 
notes that we gave to Mr. Spencer. Exhibit "7", 
containing my signature and that of M. 0. Swen-
256 son is that which we signed. That statement con-
tains the correct version of the accident. At that 
time we told Mr. McCullough to go, ahead and do 
257 what he could for us as we all wanted to stick with 
Louise. Mr. McCullough said he would take our 
cases on the same basis that he had taken Louise's. 
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258 There was no written contract drawn up at that 
time and I did not sign any contract with Mr. M c-
Cullough. Later, after Christmas, Mr. McCullough 
called us in and Mr. York, Mr. Swenson and my-
self went up to Mr. McCullough's office about an 
offer of settlement. I got $100 out of the settle-
260 ment. Exhibit "8" is the check I received. The 
settlement for all three of us was consummated at 
260 Mr. McCullough's office one or two days after 
Christmas. 
Cross Examination: I think Mr. York as 
driver of the car signed a separate statement than 
the one Mr. Swenson and myself signed. The first 
time I saw Sid Sp.encer was when he came down 
to my mother's place at Orem with my brother-in..-
law, Elmo Christensen, and took the notes of our 
269 version of the accident, which we signed. He said 
he was working with Mr. McCullough and wanted 
whatever information we could giv.e him on the 
accident. That is all he said about Mr. M cCul-
270-1 laugh. I do not recall seeing the name of Sid 
Spencer on the door of Mr. McCullough's office. 
I signed the release to the railroad company at 
Mr. McCullough's office. Later Mr. Spencer came 
27 4 down to Orem and delivered us our checks. 
Subd. (f)-
R. VERNE McCULLOUGH, a witness for 
the defense. 
Direct Examination: I saw Clarence York the 
first time in my office in the fall of 1931. I was 
35 
preparing the Louise Erickson case for trial when 
he came up there with other witnesses. I went 
over his testimony as to what he would testify to 
and called his attention to the statement (Exhibit 
4) which he had heretofore given Mr. Spencer. 
The next time I saw Mr. York was in my office 
after Christmas of 1931. Prior to this I had talk-
ed to the claim agent of the Denver & Rio Grande 
Railroad and in the course of negotiations for 
settlement of the Louise Erickson case, something 
was said with reference to the other passengers in 
the car and the claim agent stated he would prefer 
793 to get the entire matter settled with everybody if 
it could be settled. I discussed with Mr. York and 
the other passengers of the automobile the ques-
tion of getting a settlement and they told me their 
primary interest was in Miss Christensen's case. 
They further told me that I had better take care 
of all their cases. I told them I would represent 
them on the same basis as I was representing Miss 
Christensen. Their 'injuries were trivial and I did 
not take a written contract from Mr. York. Mr. 
York's doctor submitted a bill of $2. Mr. York 
did not tell me about any injury to his shoulder 
and that he was laid up for about three weeks. I 
told these passengers, including Mr. York, that I 
could get them $150 plus the cost of the damage 
to the automobile. Mr. York got $100 out of the 
settlement. His case was never filed in court and 
794 I never contemplated filing it in court. This ac-
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cident occurred on Sunday night, the 11th day of 
October, 1931. Mr. Soren C. Christensen came 
into my office on Tuesday afternoon following the 
accident. He stated that I had been recommended 
to him to handle the case for his daughter who was 
injured in the railroad accident and that she was 
in the hospital. We went over the rna tter as far 
as he knew it. He told me she had four fractures 
of the pelvis bone and told me to go ahead and 
proceed with the investigation. I told him I would 
go ahead with the investigation and said we would 
come to an understanding later on the contract. 
I told him my usual contract was 33>1 per cent 
if the matter was settled out of court and 50 per 
cent of whatever was recovered after suit was 
started and the complaint filed. He said that con-
tract was satisfactory and to go ahead with the 
case. One or two days later Mr. Christensen came 
back with his son, Elmo Christensen, to my office. 
I introduced them at that time to Mr. Sid Spencer, 
who I employed to investigate the facts in this 
case. Mr. Spencer and Mr. Christensen's son, 
went to the different parties in the automobile for 
the purpose of getting their statements. I have 
some of these statements in longhand signed by 
them and the statements transcribed into type-
writing signed by them. I went over the type-
written statement with Mr. York which he had 
signed. He offered no objections to the statement. 
Mr. York was very happy about the entire situa-
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tion until he found out that Louise Christensen 
was not going to give him a cut out of her $4500 
which she got. He said he had been offered $500 
by Mr. Kinney, the railroad claim agent for his 
case but Mr. Kinney denied it. There was no 
written contract for employment in this case ex-
797 cept the one signed by Boren C. Christensen and 
his daughter, Louise Christensen. I did not direct 
Sid Spencer to solicit any of these cases, including 
that of Mr. York, Mr. Shirley Erickson, Mr. Oren 
Swenson or anyone else. These other passengers 
each received $100 from the railroad company and 
799 I received $50 for each case. 
Subd. (f)-
OREN M. SWENSON, a witness on behalf of 
the prosecution. 
(Defense objected to re-opening the York case 
after prosecution had rested to put on the testi-
mony of Oren Swenson for the reason that two of 
the defense witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. Shirley Erick-
son had gone back to California and another had 
gone home to Moroni; that the testimony of these 
witnesses had been taken and they were excused 
667 when the prosecution stated they had no more 
820-21 testimony to put on in the York case. The objec-
tion was taken under advisement and the testi-
mony received.) 
Direct Examination: I reside at Orem, Utah. 
I was in a railroad crossing accident on October 
11, 1931. It was my automobile driven by Mr. 
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Clarence York which struck a Denver and Rio 
822 Grande train at Midvale, Utah. The occupants of 
the car were Clarence York, Louise Christensen, 
Shirley Erickson, Naomi Gooen and myself. Short-
ly after the accident Mr. Sid Spencer interviewed 
us at Orem, Utah. 
A. He came down there and said he had been 
thoroughly investigating the case, that we had a 
good case, and he took some pictures, and wanted 
us to sign a contract to let Mr. McCullough handle 
the case. Miss Christensen had to be removed to 
the County Hospital. We couldn't afford to do it. 
He said they would take care of her. We all agreed 
to let them have the case. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: I object to it as in-
competent, irrelevant and immaterial; nothing to 
do with the issues involved here. 
MR. YOUNG: The motion is denied. 
Q. Now, Mr. Swenson, do you know-
MR. DOUGLAS: You say "we", who do you 
refer to~ 
A. Mr. York, Mr. Erickson, and Louise's 
823 brother was there, Elmo Christensen. . . . 
Q. (By Mr. Thomas) \Vas anything said about 
824 his (Spencer's) connection with Verne McCul-
lough~ 
A. No sir; he just told us he had been out 
and investigated the case and took some pictures, 
and thought we had a good case .... 
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Q. Now, I will ask you whether or not you 
signed a paper for Mr. Spenced 
A. I signed a contract, and Mr. Erickson, to 
825 let Mr. Verne McCullough handle the case. 
MR. YOUNG: Do you know what the paper 
said 1 
A. Well, I don't hardly remember the words. 
I know that the contract said I had to get my 
father to sign it with me. 
826 MR. YOUNG: Do you recall his (McCul-
lough's) name being in the contract 1 
MR. McCULLOUGH: That is certainly lead-
ing and suggestive, your Honor. 
MR. DOUGLAS: He has a right to ask lead-
ing questions. 
The witness: I think so. 
A. I do not think I got a copy of the paper 
at that time. I went to Mr. McCullough's office 
about a week after the accident. I did not sign 
827 any papers at all in McCullough's office. 
Cross Examination by Mr. McCullough: My 
brother is working for Mr. Clarence York in the 
829 barber shop at Orem. Mr. York and I were very 
830 close pals. I am thirty years of age now. I was 
22 at the time of the accident. I am positive that 
the only paper I ever signed when Mr. Spencer 
was present was the contract down in Orem. I re-
member Shirley Erickson signed the same paper. 
That is the only time Mr. Spencer ever contacted 
40 
me with reference to signing a paper. I am sure 
833 that is correct as it is clear in my mind. 
(The witness was shown defendant's Exhibit 
7). That is my signature and Shirley Erickson's 
signature. (The witness was shown defendant's 
Exhibit 4). That is the signature of Mr. York. 
834 You told us, a moment ago, you only signd 
one paper with Mr. Spencer? 
A. Down there? 
Q. You told us you never signed a paper ~n 
my office? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You told me you never signed a paper while 
Mr. Spencer was there except the one you signed 
dorwn there? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. That is your signature, isn't it.'? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And that is Mr. Clar.ence York's signature? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. This is Mr. Shirley Erickson's signature, 
isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As a matter of fact, Mr. Swenson, isn't it 
a fact, without quibbling about the situation, that 
these are the three signatures to the two pieces of 
paper that were signed down in Or.em when Mr. 
834 Sid Spencer came down there? 
Q. Isn't that true, Mr. Swenson? 
A. Yes sir. 
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Q. So, as a matter of fact, you have forgotten 
all about the nature of the paper you signed, 
haven't you~ Isn't that correct 
A. Well, I remember signing a con tract. 
Q. Mr. Swenson, isn't it a fact that you 
haven't had anything to refresh your memory on 
what you signed eight years ago, except your 
conscious memory here now~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Isn't it a fact that is the document, re-
freshing your memory, the first document you 
signed down there when Mr. Spencer was there 
with Mr. Elmo Erickson-! mean Elmo Christen-
sen, Louise's brother~ 
A. I thought it was only one paper, and all 
three signed it. 
Q. Mr. York was driving your car, wasn't he~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Don't you recall that they wanted the 
driver's statement separate from the guests' state-
ments~ Do you recall that? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Don't you remember that is the reason 
why they put Mr. York's statement separately, 
and yours and Mr. Erickson's statements separ-
ately, because of the fact you were in the position 
of guests, and he was the driver of the automo-
835 bile1 
A. Yes sir. 
I talked with Mr. Boren C. Christensen, the 
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father of Louise Christensen either Tuesday or 
Wednesday following the Sunday the accident oc-
curred. I had not seen Mr. Spencer up to that 
time. Mr. Christensen told me at that time along 
with Mr. Clarence York, and Shirley Erickson 
that he had b.een up to Mr. McCullough's office 
and had employed Mr. McCullough to represent 
837 his daughter, Louise. 
MR. DOUGLAS: That conversation was be-
fore or after you had first seen Sid Spencer 1 
A. That was before. 
Q. Now, this matter, then, was discussed be-
tween you three boys and Mr. Christensen, the 
father of Louise Christensen, as early as Tues-
day or Wednesday of that week-of the week of 
the accident, wasn't iU 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't see Mr. Spencer until the lat-
ter part of the week 1 
A. No sir. 
Q. When Mr. Spencer came down, isn't it a 
fact he took down your testimony, what you knew 
about the accident, in longhand? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And then after he took it down in longhand 
839 you signed iU Do you recall thaU 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Then later he gave you a typewritten copy 
of it, and you signed the typewritten copy of iU 
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A. I don't ever remember of him ever giving 
me a copy of it. 
Q. You remember signing a typewritten copy 
of what the longhand notes disclosed~ 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. The only time that you ever put your 
name on any paper, by that I mean Mr. Spencer's 
statement, was once, wasn't it~ 
A. Yes sir. 
839 Q. There isn't any question but what that is 
your signature, is there~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. On this defendant's Exhibit 7~ 
A. No. 
Q. I never, at any time, guaranteed or prom-
ised to give you a thousand dollars, did I~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. I never made any statement to you, at any 
time, how much I would give you, or how much 
I would get you, did I~ 
A. Maybe you didn't. 
Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Swenson, that the check 
which you signed was a check made out by the 
railroad, that is, the D. & R. G.~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Isn't it a fact that the D. & R. G. Railroad 
sent me a check, and you signed it~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Nobody forced you to sign it, did they~ 
A. No sir. 
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Q. At that time you were primarily interested 
m seeing Louise Christensen taken care of, be-
cause of the nature of her injuries, weren't you~ 
A. Well, I was told if I didn't take that, that 
Miss Christensen might not get anything. 
MR. YOUNG: Do you know who told you 
thaU 
A. Mr. McCullough. 
840 MR. DOUGLAS: Who~ 
A. Mr. Verne McCullough. 
Q. Mr. Swenson, isn't it a fact that I told 
you if you didn't take that you would have to go 
to court~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And niay not get anything~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. I didn't say that Louise Christensen 
wouldn't get anything~ 
A. You said if they didn't get a fair settle-
ment without Miss Christensen being with them, 
to take it to court, you might beat it. 
Q. I never predicated the acceptance of your 
two hundred sixty-six dollars upon what Miss 
Christensen would get. 
A. No sir. 
Q. Of course not. In other words, I told you 
if it wasn't acceptable, that the only thing you 
could do was to get a lawyer and go to court. Isn't 
that true? 
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841 A. Yes, but you didn't want to take it to 
court ... 
Q. And the two doctors you employed yo,ur-
self, they said you had nothing but a bruise? 
844 A. Yes sir. 
Q. You came to my of~ice, the thr,ee of you, to 
go over the evidence when we were preparing Miss 
Christensen's case for trial? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You think that was the first time you came 
to my offic:e? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You remember at that time I told you that 
I would-when the matter of settlement was men-
tioned, I made the statement to you I would take 
your case, and these other two boys, on the same 
basis as I did Louise Christensen's? 
A. Well, I thought you took the three of 
them, all three, and Miss Christensen's without 
ours. 
Q. Have you seen Miss Christensen's con-
tract? 
A. No. 
Q. Isn't it a fact I told you and Mr. Christen-
sen if I settled the case without suit, I would get 
33;1 per cent, and aft,er suit was started, the com-
plaint was filed, it would be 50 per cent; do you 
remember that? 
A. Yes sir. 
!I 
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Q. You remember I told you I would take 
your cases on the same basis f 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And no contracts were ever signed in my 
officef 
A. No sir. 
845 Q. And no contracts were ever mentioned out-
side of this conversation in my office, were they? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. (By Mr. McCullough): That Exhibit, De-
fendant's Exhibit 7, is a true and correct state-
ment of your version of the accident, is it not, 
Mr. Swenson f 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And it is just exactly as you understood 
the accident occurred f 
846 A. Yes sir. 
NO. II 
(Subdivision (g)-Sutfin) 
R. Verne McCullough is charged with solicit-
ing employment personally from Katherine Sut-
fin. The factual testimony is as follows: 
Subd. (g)-
HOMER E. GROVE, a witness for the pro-
secution. 
Direct Examination: I reside at Las Vegas, 
Nevada. On October 8th, 1935, I was a deputy 
sheriff of Clark County, Nevada. On that date 
about 3:30 a.m. Sheriff Keate of that county in-
structed me to intercept a truck on the Highway 
47 
44-5 No. 91 coming from St. George. Mrs. Katherine 
Sutfin, two children, Mrs. Sutfin's husband's 
45-6 corpse, and a young man were in the truck. They 
were coming to Las Vegas, Nevada from St. 
George. I requested them to come to the police 
station. A short time later Mr. McCullough and 
Mr. Spencer drove up in an automobile. 
A. I had very little conversation with him 
(Mr. McCullough) at that time, other than just 
an introduction to him, and he asked to use a 
private room in the police station, and talked to 
Mrs. Sutfin, and I did not go into the private room 
48 at all. 
I could not hear what the conversation was. 
49-50 Mr. Spencer did not take part in the conversation. 
I cannot remember the exact conversation I had 
with Mr. McCullough. It has been over two years 
ago. I remember him explaining to me that he 
had arrived in St. George too late to see these 
50-1 people, and someone called Sheriff Keate to in-
tercept them there. I heard a portion of the con-
versation between Mr. McCullough and Mrs. Sut-
52 fin. As I best recall it, it was pertaining to the 
people in St. George, who had been advising her 
and assisting her-that they were all affiliated 
with the power company, or friends of the power 
company and would not give her a square deal ... 
I believe Mr. McCullough made that statement. 
53 I could not say in what connection Ellis Pickett's 
name was mentioned. She (Mrs. Sutfin) advised 
I'll 
48 
Mr. McCullough that she would not assign the 
case to him until after she had seen her attorneys 
53 in Phoenix, who were friends of the family. 
Cross Examination: I received the telephone 
call from my superior officer, Mr. Keate. He told 
55 me he had received a call from a State officer at 
Santa Clara. 
Subd. (g)-
GERALD BLAKE, a witness for the prose-
cution. 
Direct Examination: I reside at St. George, 
Utah. On or about October 8, 1935, I drove a truck 
from St. George to Las Vegas in which Mrs. Kath-
erine Sutfin was a passenger with her two chil-
57-8 dren and the dead body of her husband. Our des-
tination was Phoenix. We were stopped by Ho-
mer Grove, the deputy sheriff. And he took me to 
the police station and held me until Mr. McCul-
lough came, and he held me on the ground that 
58 there was a call came from Utah to have me stop 
for investigation, or something. I don't remember 
what it was all said to be, but, anyway, I was 
59 stopped for that one reason. Mr. Grove took us 
over to breakfast. After breakfast we met Mr. 
McCullough and Mr. Spencer. There was a con-
59 versation between Mr. McCullough and Mrs. Sut-
fin. It has been so long I have forgotten most of 
that conversation. In fact, I have forgotten the 
biggest part of it . ... He said that he had come 
down from Salt Lake, and that he would like to in-
49 
61 terview her, and they went in and talked. And that 
he had come down and would like to get the case, 
and would like to know what she had done about 
it-if she had hired anybody, and I don't reme'lrlr-
ber much more about it. I walked out of the office. 
62 In just a few moments Mrs. Sutfin came out and 
got in the truck. Mr. McCullough came over to 
side of truck. Mrs. Sutfin said she was undecided 
what to do. 
A. The reason she was undecided what to do was 
that she had had an attorney in Phoenix that had 
done some work before, and she wanted to consult 
him. She tells Mr. McCullorugh that she would like 
to think this thing over and see what she would do 
about it, and he said he would go ahead and inves-
tigate the case and then ·they would correspond 
back and forth from Phoenix to Salt Lake and then 
we pulled out . ... 
64 She (Mrs. Sutfin) said she was afraid that 
maybe Mr. McCullough had been paid by the Dixie 
Power Company to come down there and buy her 
off. That was the very words she said. 
Cross Examination: 
Q. You said something about she (Mrs. Sut-
fin) inquired about whether somebody was con-
nected with the power company-Dixie Power 
Company. 
A. Well, she was afraid of every lawyer in the 
State of Utah. 
67 Q. Did she say that? 
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A. Yes, she told me that. And she had known 
this fellow in Phoenix - he was taking a case be-
fore for her, and she knew him, and she was going 
to consult him ... 
Q. Did she say anything about that she had 
refused to hire Mr. Pickett because he was con-
nected with the Dixie Power Company? 
A. Well, she said this much, that she was not 
going to hire anybody until she got down there, 
68 and then she would find o,ut what to do . .. 
A. The only thing I remember her saying 
about Mr. Pickett was that Mrs. Hail tried to get 
69 her to get Mr. Pickett. 
Q. Did she say that she would not get him.'!! 
A. No, she did not. She said she was afraid 
of all of them, and she would go down ther.e and 
think this thing over when she had a little time, 
and decide what she was going to do. 
Q. Did she say that she wmtld not hire any 
70 lawyer, and would not until she got to Phoenix? 
A. What was your question'# 
Q. All right-did she say anything about that 
she had not and would not hire any lawy.er? 
A. She said she had not consulted any lawyer. 
Q. That she had not? 
A. Yes. 
Subd. (g)-
ELLIS J. PICKETT, a witness for the pro-
secution. 
Direct Examination: I am an attorney at law 
51 
residing at St. George, Utah. I was in Salt Lake 
74 at the time of the accident. Mr. Hail of the Lib-
erty Hotel called me up and I went over and saw 
Mrs. Sutfin the evening before she left for Phoe-
nix. I made an investigation of the accident and 
75 had some pictures taken. At about 11 o'clock the 
same morning Mrs. Sutfin left for Phoenix I saw 
Mr. McCullough who had just arrived back from 
Las Vegas. I told Mr. McCullough at that time 
that Mrs. Sutfin had employed me to handle that 
case for her and he said he had talked with her at 
Las Vegas and she had not employed him but he 
77 had told her he would make some investigation 
for her. Mr. McCullough told me that Mrs. Sutfin 
77 told him that she had not employed anyone. I did 
78 not participate in any negotiations for settlement 
or anything of that sort. I do not recall ever re-
78 ceiving any word from Mrs. Sutfin after she left 
St. George. 
Cross Exarn.ination: 
I saw a letter from Mrs. Sutfin to Mrs. Hail 
in which Mrs. Sutfin said she had not employed 
me. She said she had employed som.e Phoenix law-
yers and I wrote them and told them of my con-
79-80 nection with the case. 
Q. And in that letter she said that she had 
never employed you? 
A. As I recall it, I think that was true, that 
she said that, yes. 
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Q. But in that particular she was wrong~ 
80 A. Yes. 
I never made any formal contract with Mrs. 
Sutfin. It was a verbal contract. After Mr. Mc-
Cullough got a formal contract from Mrs. Sutfin, 
he talked with me about paying for the work I had 
80 done on the case. He said he would try and get it 
for me. I wrote a letter on November 7, 1935 (De-
fendant's Exhibit "1") to Lewkowitz & Zaver-
sack, Mrs. Sutfin's attorneys at Phoenix. In that 
letter I said in part : 
"Mr. Hail of the Hotel L~oerty has handed me 
your letter of November 4th, in which you state 
82 that Mrs. Sutfin has employed your office to rep-
resent her in the matter of the death of her hus-
band and she advised you that she had not em-
ployed any attorney, especially me (Mr. Pickett) 
83 to repres.ent her." 
Subd. (g)-
BEN LINGENFELTER, a witness for the 
435 defense. 
Direct Examination by Mr. McCullough: I am 
employed by the International Harvester Com-
pany. I formerly was associated with the State of 
Utah Highway Patrol. Prior to that I was As-
sistant athletic coach at the University of Utah 
under Coach Armstrong. I met Mr. McCullough 
shortly after coming to Salt Lake in 1925. In Oc-
436 tober of 1935 I was assigned to the checking sta-
tion at Santa Slara, Utah. At that time I resided 
53 
at the Liberty Hotel at St. George. I recall the 
accident on October 5, 1935, in which Mr. Sutfin 
436 was killed on Highway No. 91 in the vicinity of 
St. George. After the inquest I heard a conversa-
tion between Mrs. Hail of the Liberty Hotel and 
Mrs. Sutfin with reference to the employment of 
lawyers. After the conversation Mrs. Hail told 
me that Mrs. Sutfin would prefer to get an out-
side lawyer in the case and suggested Mr. McCul-
4:37 lough and Harley Gustin. Mrs. Hail asked me to 
call Mr. McCullough or Harley Gustin. I called 
438 Mr. McCullough on the telephone. In discussing 
the employment of lawyers with Mrs. Hail, I be-
lieve, as I remember, the problem came up that 
McCullough had handled more cases of this type 
than Gustin, and he would probably be more suit-
440 able. I don't recall anything that was said be-
tween Mrs. Hail and Mrs. Sutfin relative to Mrs. 
Sutfin's attitude toward any local attorney. 
Q. When you called me (McCullough) on the 
telephone, what did you say, in substance? 
A. Well, in substance, I simply asked you to 
come down and talk to this lady-that Mrs. Hail 
had asked me to call you at her suggestion, and 
Mrs. Hail had been more or less trying to help this 
poor woman out, and in my estimation it looked 
like a case against the Southern Utah Power Com-
pany, and that somebody should come down there 
and take care of it, because I believed that this 
440 woman was entitled to some sort of remuneration. 
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About three or four o'clock the next mornng 
I saw Mr. McCullough at the Santa Clara check-
ing station. It was about an hour and a half or 
two hours after Mrs. Sutfin had left for Phoenix, 
Arizona. I remember asking Mr. McCullough why 
in the world he had not arrived earlier in the eve-
mng. 
Q. Did you make any suggestions with refer-
ence to contacting Mrs. Sutfin? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what suggestion did you make? 
A. That I could probably call Sheriff K eate-
I believe his name was-at Las Vegas, and ask 
him to stop her and tell her that the attorney that 
she was waiting fo,r in St. George would come on 
down there and meet her, and to wait for him. 
Q. And who made that suggestion about call-
ing the sheriff? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did I even suggest it at all? 
A. N o-I would not say that you had. 
Q. Now, did you call the sheriff at Las Vegas? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. State what you told the sheriff at Las 
Vegas¥ 
A. As near as I can remember, I told Sheriff 
Keate that this lady was going down there with 
her two youngsters, and a driver, in a Chevrolet 
truck, as I remember it, and her husband's body 
was in the back end of this truck, which, as I re-
55 
member, was a flat platform truck, an that there 
was an attorney here that would like to talk to 
442 that lady, and would he tell her to wait for him 
in Las Vegas; and, as I remember it, he said he 
would. As I remember, Sheriff Keate replied that 
he would stop this truck. 
Q. Did you ever tell the sheriff of Clark 
County, Mr. Keate, that this lady, Mrs. Sutfin, 
was wanted for investigation by the Utah offi-
cials~ 
A. No, I tried to be very careful in explaining 
to him the situation, because I did not think there 
was any reason why that he could legally hold her 
for anything. 
Q. Then after that conversation you saw me 
leave in a car for Las Vegas~ 
A. You left in that direction. That is as far 
as I know. 
Q. Is that the only thing that you recall about 
my presence at that time; that is, is that what you 
recall of the situation~ 
443 A. I believe that is about the story. 
Cross Examinatioot: In the conversation be-
tween Mrs. Sutfin and Mrs. Hale I did not hear 
any discussion about Mr. Pickett. I am positive 
that we (Mrs. Hail and I) discussed both Verne 
McCullough and Harley G1.tstin, and that I called 
McCullough after discussing the circumstances as 
to the probable efficiency or proficiency, compar-
atively of the two men, and that Mrs. Hail told me 
56 
to go ahead and call McCullough then. Mrs. Hail 
446 personally knew Harley Gustin and she knew Mr. 
McCullough by reputation. After I talked with 
Mr. McCullough on the telephone I told Mrs. Sut-
450 fin and Mrs. Hail that he was coming down. Mrs. 
Sutfin waited there quite a while that evening for 
451 Mr. McCullough before she left with her husband's 
body. I had not heard that Mrs. Sutfin had re-
tained a local attorney previmts to my calling Mr. 
454 McCullough. vVhen Mr. McCullough arrived at 
the Santa Clara station I told him that Mrs. Sutfin 
had gone on to Las Vegas, and although I suggest-
ed I could have Sheriff Keate stop her and tell her 
that McCullough was coming to Las Vegas, Mr. 
McCullough was rather indifferent about going to 
456 Las Vegas, but upon my suggestion he decided to 
go and I called Sheriff Keate to inform Mrs. Sut-
461 fin. I never called Mr. McCullough before or since 
on any case or any litigation. I have never receiv-
ed any money whatsoever relative to this case and 
I reported the entire incident to my superior of-
462 ficer who approved my conduct. 
Subd. (g)-
R. VERNE McCULLOUGH, a witness for 
the defense. 
Direct Examination: This accident occurred 
on October 5, 1935. I learned of this case the first 
time on October 7, 1935. After luncheon on that 
day, Ben Lingenfelter phoned me from St. George 
and stated that the widow of Mr. Sutfin who had 
57 
been killed had requested Mrs. Hail of the Liberty 
Hotel to have me come down on this particular 
case. He stated it would be necessary to come as 
quickly as possible as they contemplated taking 
the body to Phoenix, Arizona. I told him I was 
in court that afternoon but would come down as 
799 soon as possible. I rode down to St. George with 
Mr. Sid Spencer in his automobile. We arrived 
there between two and three o'clock in the morn-
ing. Upon arriving in St. George, we went to the 
Liberty Hotel and talked with Mrs. Hail. She 
stated Mrs. Sutfin had requested her to telephone 
me and that she had waited practically all night 
and had decided I was not coming; that she had 
800 left for Phoenix. Mrs. Hail advised me that Mr. 
Lingenfelter was at the checking station at Santa 
Clara. I went over and talked to Mr. Lingenfelter 
who stated that the woman had gone on about an 
hour before. I told him I was sorry but I could 
not get there sooner. Mr. Lingenfelter suggested 
that he would call the Sheriff at Las Vegas to 
have him intercept Mrs. Sutfin and tell her we 
were on the road to Las Vegas. I thanked him 
for this courtesy. Mr. Lingenfelter put in a call 
to the Sheriff at Las Vegas and told him that the 
attorney Mrs. Sutfin had requested to come down 
from Salt Lake was on the road over there and 
asked him if he would give that information to 
Mrs. Sutfin who was traveling in a truck with 
her two little children, a young man and her hus-
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band's corpse. I heard him tell the Sheriff to tell 
Mrs. Sutfin that we would meet her at the police 
station. Mr. Spencer and I then drove to Las 
802 Vegas. We arrived there about seven o'clock in 
the morning. Mrs. Sutfin and her children were 
over eating breakfast. When she came back from 
breakfast we went into a private room in the po-
lice station. I could see that she was all upset. 
She first asked me if I was connected with the 
Southern Utah Power Company otherwise known 
as the Dixie Power Company. I told her I was 
not connected with any power company. She then 
asked me about Mr. Pickett-if he was connected 
with the company. I told her I did not know a 
thing about Mr. Pickett and did not care to dis-
cuss the merits or demerits of any lawyer. I asked 
her if she had employed Mr. Pickett and she said 
absolutely not, that she had not employed anybody. 
She said she was afraid of any lawyer in Southern 
Utah on account of their connection with the power 
company. I told Mrs. Sutfin she was in no condi-
803 tion to employ a lawyer. I told her to go on into 
Phoenix and after her husband's funeral, I would 
be very pleased to discuss the matter with her. I 
further told her that on the road back I would get 
all the evidence available. I told her she could 
have this evidence if she desired to employ an at-
torney in Phoenix or if her people there wanted 
their own attorney. About this time Mr. Grove, 
the deupty sheriff, sent a piece of paper in to her 
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and she showed it to me. The statement said, 
''Please do not hire McCullough. We have a law-
yer for you.'' I advised Mrs. Sutfin not to hire 
any lawyer but to go on to Phoenix and get her 
husband's body buried and then write me as to 
what she intended to do in the matter. She then 
went out and got in the truck and left for Phoenix. 
804 I went back to St. George and made a thorough 
investigation of the accident. I talked with Mr. 
Ashley of the Miller Garage who informed me 
that Mr. Pickett had been taking pictures of the 
car at the scene of the accident on that day, Octo-
ber 8th, notwithstanding the accident occurred on 
October 5th. Mr. Ashley told me he had towed 
the car back to the scene of the accident for the 
purpose of these pictures. I then went over to 
Mr. Pickett's office and he told me that Mrs. Sut-
fin had talked with him the night b,efore she left for 
Phoenix but had not given him a contract. I told 
Mr. Pickett she had not employed me and explain-
805 ed to him how I happened to come down to St. 
George. I told him that I had not been employed 
except to make an investigation. On October 9th, 
1935, when I returned to Salt Lake City, I sent 
Mrs. Sutfin a letter, a copy of which is marked 
808 "Defendant's Exhibit 18" and is set out in the 
transcript. I received a letter from Lewkowitz & 
Zaversack bearing date of October 16, 1935. (This 
letter is marked Exhibit 19 and set out in the 
transcript on page 812.) This letter stated that 
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they had been employed to represent Mrs. Sutfin 
and the writer of the letter thanked me on behalf 
of Mrs. Sutfin for my former kindnesses to her. 
I next heard from Mrs. Sutfin on November 30, 
1935, when I received a telegram asking me to 
meet her in St. George-defendant's "Exhibit 17" 
set out in the transcript on page 808. I did not 
go to St. George. Mrs. Sutfin came to Salt Lake 
City and employed me to represent her in the case. 
She showed me a letter from attorneys Lewkowitz 
and Zaversack dated November 29th, 1935, in 
which they released her from any obligation as 
far as they were concerned and stated they had 
813 withdrawn as attorneys from the case. This letter 
813 is Exhibit 21. She had Lewkowitz & Zaversack's 
files of correspondence in the case. I then entered 
into a written contract (Defendant's Exhibit No. 
22) with Mrs. Katherine Sutfin. I did not author-
814 ize any person to solicit this case for me and no-
body did solicit the case for me. 
Subd. (d-e-f-g)-
R. VERNE McCULLOUGH, a witness for 
the defense. 
Cross Examination: During the years 1930 
to 1936 Mr. Spencer did investigation work for me 
854-6 on cases which came into my office. I paid him 
on the quantum meruit or what I thought was a 
fair value for the work he did for me on each case. 
857 Our practice was to settle with Mr. Spencer from 
time to time. We went over the work he had done 
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during a given period and arrived at a figure 
which we felt was fair. We then struck a balance. 
919 He drew money when he needed it. I would pay 
him different amounts on account as he requested 
it. I also paid him checks for expenses which he 
919 incurred, which accounts for checks of odd 
amounts. I have submitted all the checks I could 
find that were made payable to Sid Spencer. (A 
922 list of checks set out on page 922 of transcript.) 
The quality of Mr. Spencer's service was a factor 
in determining his compensation for his investiga-
926 tion work. 
Occasionally Mr. Spencer did other work for 
me such as filing papers and extra stenographic 
work. He worked for other people and other law-
858 yers during that period. He investigated cases 
for dozens of lawyers. I understood he investi-
gated, or contemplated investigating one for you 
(Mr. Rogers). I may be mistaken, that may be 
864 another one of those rumors. I have never heard 
from any reliable sources that Mr. Spencer had 
858 solicited for me. I have heard a lot of things from 
you (Mr. Rogers) or your kind about Spencer be-
ing an ambulance chaser. Mr. Spencer paid one-
858 third of the office rental of the entire suite, one-
third of the telephone bill and one-third of the 
861 stenographer's expense. Mr. Spencer never at any 
time indicated he was soliciting business for me. 
862 Mr. Spencer vacated the room in connection with 
864 our offices in the spring of 1937. 
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Q. (By Mr. Rogers): Do you still employ 
him to investigate matters~ 
A. I haven't employed Mr. Spencer for some 
time. 
Q. Now, he was a very thorough, expert In-
vestigator, wasn't he~ 
A. Yes, one of the best in the business. 
Q. Why did you discontinue his services, Mr. 
McCullough~ 
864 A. Because Mr. Tingey, who was the former 
president of the Bar Association talked with 
me about the relationship between Mr. Spen-
cer and myself, and he stated that there had 
been some complaints come to the Bar Associa-
tion, and he said, the fact that Mr. Spencer is in 
the adjoining office, in the same suite of offices, 
it may be due to the fact that you have used him 
so many times in your cases that it lends a lot of 
color to these rumors about the fact he is chasing 
cases for you; and I said, Mr. Tingey, so far as 
I am concerned, if the Bar Association feels as 
you feel, I don't want that situation to continue. 
For that reason, I notified Mr. Spencer that 
I prefer he make another business connection and 
eliminate that situation entirely, so far as I was 
concerned. 
However, subsequent to that time there had 
been a number of cases which he had investigated 
for me, and naturally they were finished in the 
course of time. 
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I feel there has been an absolute injustice to 
him, on occasions of that kind, due to the fact-
I mean the rumors which are not predicated upon 
facts at all. However, Mr. Spencer was in his 
own office before he came down to our suit of 
offices. He had an office in the Deseret National 
Bank Building, and functioned under the same 
name. He has been functioning now for a year, 
now, in exactly the same situation. I seem to be 
the only one anybody seems to be interested in. 
865 That is the thing I can't understand. 
I handled a great number of cases in the Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County during the period 
from May 14th, 1932 to July 1st, 1937. I can not 
say whether that number reached 154 personal in-
937 jury cases or not as indicated by "Exhibit J." A 
lot of these cases set forth in ''Exhibit J'' are 
940 not personal injury cases. 
Subd. ( d, e, f, g)-
L. 0. THOMAS, a witness for the prosecu-
tion. 
This witness identified ''Exhibit J'' as a list 
of cases which he took off of the docket of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County; 
941 "Exhibit J" admitted in evidence. 
No. III 
(Subdivisions (1) and (m)-Harry Erickson) 
So that your Honorable Court will be fully 
apprised of the nature of these two charges, we 
set them out verbatim: '' i• h 
I' 
I) 
i 
64 
"(1) That on, to-wit, the 8th day of March, 
1937, there was pending in the City Court of Salt 
Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
a criminal action entitled' State of Utah vs. Harry 
E. Erickson' and the said R. Verne McCullough 
was then attorney for the said Harry E. Erickson. 
That at said time the said Harry E. Erickson had 
been released by the court to the custody of the 
said R. Verne McCullough, his attorney. That on 
or about said date a bench warrant for the arrest 
of the said Harry E. Erickson was issued by the 
court, the said Harry E. Erickson having failed 
to appear for hearing in said criminal action. 
That thereafter, although the said R. Verne Mc-
Cullough well knew the whereabouts of the said 
Harry E. Erickson in the State of Califo.rnia, the 
said R. Verne McCullough refused and failed to 
divulge to the court or to the sheriff's office or to 
the office of the Salt Lake County Attorney the 
whereabouts of the said Harry E. Erickson. 
"(m) That on or about the 13th day of April, 
1937, in the City of Salt Lake, State of Utah, the 
said R. Verne McCullough did testify as a wit-
ness in his own behalf having been duly sworn to 
tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth, in a certain proceeding entitled, 'The State 
of Utah ex rel. B. P. Leverich, City Judge vs. R. 
Verne McCullough,' in which the said R. Verne 
McCullough did testify falsely and in said testi-
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mony did state as true matter in substance as 
follows: 
" 'I told Erickson not to, leave before he saw 
me.' 
" 'I didn't see Erickson again or talk with 
him again after the morning of Thursday, the 4th 
of March.' 
" 'I don't know wher.e Erickson is except that 
I was informed that he had relatives some place 
in California, and I imagine that he is with them.' 
''That in truth and in fact the said R. Verne 
McCullough did see and did talk to Harry E. Er-
ickson on the 5th day of March, 1937, and did then 
advise and counsel the said Harry E. Erickson to 
immediately leave the State of Utah. 
''That in truth and in fact the said R. Verne 
McCullough knew the address and telephone num-
ber of the said Harry E. Erickson in Riverside, 
California, at the time the said R. Verne McCul-
lough testified on the said 13th day of April, 
1937." 
The factual testimony is as follows : 
Subd. (1, m)-
R. VERNE McCULLOUGH, a witness for 
the defense. 
(No testimony of this witness is abstracted 
except on sustained charges.) 
Direct Examination: I am an attorney at 
law and have been since 1920. I am a graduate 
of the University of Utah and Stanford Univer-
'! 
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sity. I represented the defendant in the case of 
"State of Utah, plaintiff, vs. Harry Erickson, 
defendant," filed in the Salt Lake City Court on 
622 or about the 8th day of February, 1937, Case No. 
22738, District Court No. 10501. (Files in evi-
dence 17-26-388). The defendant was charged 
with the crime of carnal knowledge on the person 
of Beth Standing, age 13 years. I appeared for 
Erickson in said court on said February 8th, 
1937. Defendant could not furnish bond and I in-
formed Judge Leverich I had previously repre-
sented defendant in a civil matter and knew de-
fendant's father and family-his father and fam-
ily having a good reputation. It was my under-
standing that Judge Leverich released the defen-
dant on his own recognizance. The court record 
shows that he was released in my custody and 
I am not attempting to negative the record. The 
624 preliminary hearing was set for February 24th 
in the Erickson case. Pursuant to stipulation and 
while I was in the State of California, Mr. Har-
old ~Wallace, County Attorney, appeared before 
Judge Leverich on the 24th of February and had 
the preliminary hearing continued until the 4th 
624 of March, 1937. At 9:30a.m. March 4th, Mr. Har-
old Wallace informed me that he had talked with 
Mr. Lawrence Standing, the father of the prose-
cutrix, and his attorney, Mr. Nicholas G. Morgan, 
and that he had decided to dismiss the action, on 
626 the condition that Harry Erickson leave town. 
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I thereupon used Mr. \Vallace's telephone and 
called Mr. Erickson, the defendant, and told him 
the County Attorney was going to dismiss the 
action providing he left the State of Utah, but 
I expressly told him not to leave until he saw me. 
Erickson agreed to the condition of the dismissal 
and stated he would be up to my office and see 
me that afternoon. That same morning at ten 
o'clock the County Attorney moved to dismiss the 
627 action against Harry E. Erickson for lack of evi-
dence. The motion was denied and the court con-
628 tinued the case until March 5th, indicating he 
would reconsider the motion for dismissal. March 
5th, the court refused to change his ruling, and 
the County Attorney not having a medical witness 
available, the court continued the hearing until 
Saturday, March 6th, at 10:00 o'clock. On that 
630 date the County Attorney again renewed his mo-
631 tion to dismiss the case for lack of evidence. The 
639 motion was denied. In my four years experience 
as a prosecutor and fifteen years as a defending 
lawyer, I have not had the experience of a judge 
refusing to dismiss a case upon the motion of the 
632 prosecution. It is my understanding of the law 
that the sole prerogative of dismissing such a case 
was with the prosecution, and that Judge Leverich 
as a committing magistrate, had no power to re-
fuse to grant the prosecutor's motion. I was will-
632 ing to yield obedience to Judge Leverich's ruling 
645 notwithstanding I felt he was in error. 
I 
I ! ' 
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I did not see the defendant on Thursday, 
March 4th, as I went to Ogden on that afternoon. 
I did not see the defendant on March 5th. My 
stenographer informed him of the judge's de-
cision and to be present in Judge Leverich's court 
on Saturday, March 6th at 10:00 o'clock a.m. when 
I was going to make a motion for a change of judge 
633 by reason of prejudice of Judge Leverich. On 
the 6th of March I appeared in Judge Leverich's 
court and moved for a change of judge on the 
grounds of prejudice. The judge granted the mo-
tion and forthwith transferred the case to Judge 
643 A. H. Ellett. The defendant did not appear in 
court that morning, notwithstanding he had been 
told by my stenographer the day before to be 
there. In the absence of Judge Ellett, the County 
Attorney and I agreed to appear before Judge 
Ellett Monday, March 8th, for further proceed-
ings in the case. On the afternoon of Saturday, 
March 6th, without my knowledge, Judge Ellett 
issued a bench warrant for the defendant and 
fixed his bail in the sum of $10,000. This infor-
642 mation was first conveyed to me by Judge Ellett 
on Monday, March 8th, when I approached him 
in his small claims court with reference to the 
defendant's case. At that time he asked me if I 
knew about the defendant leaving the state. I told 
Judge Ellett at that time that I did not know any-
thing about the defendant leaving the state and 
that if he had left the state there must be some 
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misunderstanding on his part. I told Judge Ellett 
the only thing I ever told the defendant was what 
the County Attorney told me. The last time I 
talked with him was on Thursday morning, March 
4th, over the telephone when I informed him the 
County Attorney was going to dismiss the action 
providing he left town, but I expressly told him 
not to go until he saw me. I told Judge Ellett 
that I knew the defendant did not leave town on 
Thursday and Friday because he had been in my 
office and talked with my stenographer who had 
642 informed him of the progress of the case. Fol-
lowing my conversation with Judge Ellett on 
March 8th, 1937, I went back to my office and 
telephoned Mrs. Clyde J. Davison, a sister-in-
law of the defendant, as to Harry Erickson's 
whereabouts. She was reluctant about saying any-
thing about the situation so I asked her to have 
her husband come up to my office as soon as 
645 possible. After luncheon they came to my office. 
They told me the defendant had left for Cali-
fornia Saturday morning. They did not disclose 
to me where I could locate him. They said: «Un-
doubtedly he will probably stop at some of his 
relatives," and I said, «Well, can you give me any 
information as to where I can locate hirn, because 
he has got to return." I said, «He would be a 
fttgitive." They said, «We will get in touch with 
him and have him call you," and I said, "You 
have hint call rne any tirne at night, station to sta-
I' 
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646 tion and I will be home" and they said that they 
would call their relatives in California and try 
to locate him. On that day, March 8th, I wrote a 
letter to Reed Callister of the law firm of Cannon 
and Callister, who office in the Bank of America 
646-7 building at Los Angeles. I had previously told 
the defendant that Mr. Callister and Mr. Cannon 
had radio connections in Southern California and 
that if he went to California after his case was 
over they could undoubtedly help him get a po-
sition as the defendant was a very fine musician. 
647 (See letter, p. 331 of transcript, Exhibit G.) 
On the night of March 9th, or the early morn-
ing of March lOth, 1937, I received a station to 
station telephone call from Erickson. He did not 
649 disclose to me his whereabouts in Los Angeles but 
said he was going under an assumed name. (See 
614 affidavit of Reed E. Callister of Los Angeles for 
corroboration). He told me his sister-in-law had 
called and requested him to call me and I told him 
-I asked him why he had left town and he stated 
he was sick and tired of the case, that the judge 
was prejudiced against him, that he had been re-
liably informed the Standings wanted the case 
dismissedr---that they would not extradite, and that 
he had just left town. I never talked with Stand-
649 ings about this case except the conversation I had 
with Lawrence Standing in the presence of Judge 
Leverich in his chambers on the morning of March 
650 4th. I told the defendant there was only one thing, 
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left to do and that was to get back here and see 
this thing through; that I had every reason to be-
lieve that Mr. Wallace would renew the mo1tion to 
dismiss. I told him he had no reason to disappear 
and leav.e for California and that I was sure that 
if he would come back voluntarily his case would 
not be prejudiced if the matter was reasonably 
explained to the court. II e said, "I am not coming 
back.'' I asked him where I could locate him and 
651 he stated he was no,t disclosing his whereabouts 
to anybody. On the evening of March 25th after 
12 midnight, the telephone rang and upon answer-
ing the same I learned that the defendant was on 
the other end of the wire. He stated he had a very 
unpleasant experience that day, when he went up 
to the Musicians Union to register for work in 
the state of California; that he had given them 
his correct name and was informed that a couple 
of deputy sheriffs from Los Angeles County had 
been looking for him; that he did not know what 
to do and decided to telephone me. I told him that 
he was going to be picked up and there was only 
one thing to do about it, and that was to get back 
here. II e then told me he had been informed the 
Standings would absolutely refuse to extradite or 
do anything to prosecute him. I told him the 
Standings may not have anything to say about it, 
and advised him to retu,rn to Utah. I told him if he 
did not want my advice to consult Mr. Cannon or 
Mr. Callister, the attorneys at Los Angeles. (See 
.,, 
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affidavit of Reed E. Callister, an attorney in Los 
Angeles for corroboration of McCullough's testi-
614 mony). Before I had a chance to ask him where 
he was, he hung up the phone. In the station to 
station long distance calls neither the identity of 
the defendant nor his whereabouts was disclosed 
652 to me by the telephone operator. 
On April 13, 1937, I was cited before Judge 
Leverich for contempt. On the 14th of April, 
1937, I was found guilty of contempt for the al-
leged disobedience of the lawful orders of the 
court in not having the defendant present on the 
4th and 6th days of March, 1937. After having 
668 been found guilty of contempt I made up my mind 
I was going to get hold of this fellow Erickson, 
find out where he was and go down there and get 
him if I had to bring him back. On the afternoon 
of April 14th, I contacted Mr. and Mrs. Clyde J. 
653 Davison and told them it was absolutely impera-
tive that I get the defendant's address. Mr. Da-
vison gave me the address ·of his brother, M. G. 
Davison at Riverside, California. He told me I 
could probably locate the defendant through that 
party. I put in a station to station call to the 
residence of M. G. Davison on the night of April 
14th. Mrs. M. G. Davison told me that Harry Er-
ickson was not there but that she would try to 
locate him. I told her it was very important that 
I talk with Mr. Erickson and to have him phone 
me at my expense. Later that night or the early 
73 
654 morning of April 15th, Harry Erickson telephoned 
me on a station to station call. He did not dis-
close his whereabouts. I told him about the con-
tempt proceedings and having been found guilty 
of contempt for his failure to appear in court. I 
informed him that the authorities would bring him 
back and again advised him to get back before 
there was any more notoriety in the case. Erick-
son told me then he was not coming back to the 
state of Utah and would never come back and hung 
up the phone. I learned that Harry Erickson was 
655 arrested in California the latter part of April 
when I was in New York City. Upon my return 
from New York I talked with Harry Erickson at 
657 the County Jail on May 9th. 
On the following day I got him out of jail on 
659 bond by the order of Judge Schiller. I continued 
to represent him until on or about the 20th of May 
when my services were terminated upon my refus-
al to use perjured witnesses in support of a fake 
alibi proposed by the defendant. (See affidavit 
of Harold L. Gannett and Edna Gannett, his wife, 
two witnesses Erickson solicited in an attempt to 
616 support his perjured alibi.) 
MR. McCULLOUGH: I would like to make 
this statement as part of my own testimony-that 
the reason I did not disclose to the court the con-
versations that I had with Mr. Erickson on the 
telephone is because I was not asked for any tele-
phone conversations, in the first place. In the 
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second place, that it was my understanding, not 
only of the rules of the Bar Association of the 
State of Utah, but of the law which prescribes the 
duty of an attorney to his client, which is to the 
same effect, that I must maintain inviolate the 
confidence at every peril to myself to preserve the 
secr.ets of my client. I refer to subdivision 5 of 
Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Professional Con-
duct, Utah State Bar Association, which reiterates 
that statute as to the duty of an attorney to his 
client with reference to confidential information. 
MR. YOUNG: That is getting it down pretty 
close, there. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Now, as to the third 
point: I disclosed to the court every bit of infor-
mation that was pertinent and that I had up to 
the 14th of April, as to the whereabouts of Mr. 
Erickson. I call your attention to the fact that on 
page 80 (Exhibit 12) of my testimony which was 
introduced by Mr. Rogers, I think it was asked 
673 me: 
Q. And you say you had a conversation with 
Judge Leverich after this defendant was supposed 
to have left, and talked with Judge Leverich about 
his whereabouts~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. At that time you told him that the defen-
dant was in California~ 
A. I said that was my information, that he 
was in California . .. I said, u I am going down to 
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California the latter part of the month or the first 
of next month, and I will look him up and advise 
him to return;" and Judge Leverich said, "That 
is the proper thing to do." 
MR. ROGERS : Judge Ellett. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: That is not correct; 
that is a mistake. Judge Leverich said, "That is 
the proper thing to do; that is what I would ad-
vise you to do.'' 
Q. You want the Court to understand that you 
did not tell him that you knew where the defen-
dant was at that time? 
A. No, I did not tell him that. I don't know 
now where he is. I don't know now where he is 
(repeated) except by hearsay. I have not seen the 
defendant. I don't know whether he is in Califor-
nia or not. 
At the time I was testifying was either the 
late afternoon of April 13th or the early morning 
of April 14th, and I had not had the conversation 
with him as I detailed, on the evening of April 
674 14th, at this time-
MR. DOUGLAS: You had talked with him on 
the ninth. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Yes-and I told Judge 
Leverich that it was my information he was in 
California. 
Then I call your attention again to my testi-
mony, in answer to the question propounded by 
Judge Leverich: 
1, 
'I 
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Q. Isn't it a fact that you said to me that you 
wished that I would dismiss the case; that the de-
fendant is down there, that you knew where he 
was, and that you could get him back; and that 
you were going down in a couple of weeks, and 
that you would get him back1 
A. I made this statement-not in that lan-
guage, Judge-! don't want to be misunderstood. 
Of course, when we are talking outside of the rules 
of evidence, I may have used the statement about 
that I knew he was in California. If that state-
ment was made, it was made with the understand-
ing I had information that he was in the State of 
California. (Ex. 12, p. 82.) 
And then I call your attention to additional 
answer on page 83 : 
A. I think, as I recall the exact language, 
Judge, was that I was sorry the case was not dis-
missed. I may have used the expression that I 
wished the case was dismissed, but certainly I 
never had any right to anticipate that you would 
dismiss it. I certainly never had any idea of mak-
ing any request for the purpose of you dismissing 
it, because I immediately told you I was going 
down to California the latter part of the month, or 
the first of next month, and would try to get hold 
675 of the d.efendant and advise him to return to Utah 
and fight the case . ... 
MR. DOUGLAS: That is all in the record 1 
MR. McCULLOUGH: (Continues, quoting): 
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Q. Don't you recall saying you knew where 
he was, and you could get him? Do you recall that 
statement? 
A. I don't remember it in that language, 
Judge. I r.emember I told you he was in Califor-
nia, that I could locate him, because I still think 
I can locate him if he is there, because I know that 
long before he ever left that was his intention, of 
going to California. 
Then in the latter part of it I stated again: 
"I knew he was going to California." ... I think 
I stated to you that he was down there with rel-
atives, and I don't recall ever saying that I knew 
where his relatives lived, because I didn't know. 
I couldn't possibly have given the judge any 
more information unless I had told him the source 
676 of my information. 
Now, I want to call the Commission's atten-
tion to two or three things that I think my testi-
mony should contain: \¥hen I was questioned on 
direct examination by Judge Lewis he asked me 
the question: (Ex. 12, p. 51) 
Q. Do you remember the incidents that oc-
curred during the week beginning March the 1st 
and ending March the 8th, with reference to one 
Erickson who was under arrest? And that is the 
subject matter which we were discussing at the 
time of the contempt proceedings. And when this 
controversy arose is related here in the tran-
script. 
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MR. ROGERS : Your answer is on 63, I think, 
in the middle of the page. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: When I made the an-
swer to the question : 
Q. Did you have any direct communication 
with him at any time aft.er the morning of Thurs-
day, March the 5th? 
A. No, I never talked with Mr. Erickson after 
the morning of Thursday, March the 4th, at 9:00 
o'clock, 9:20 or 9:30 in the morning-! had ref-
erence at that time to the detailing of the events 
of the particular we.ek prior to the time Har·ry 
Erickson left town on Saturday morning. 
MR. DOBBS: Your position is that that must 
be considered in connection with its text, and if 
the text shows-and that the nature of the ques-
tions then being asked you was of the character to 
lead you to believe that you were not being in-
terrogated with respect to anything occurring 
after March 6th? 
678 MR. McCULLOUGH: I wasn't ev:en asked 
anything after that. 
MR. H.ANSEN: At that time the offense of 
contempt was complete, if he was guilty of con-
tempt. 
MR. DOBBS: Yes. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Next question: (Reads) 
(Ex. 12, p. 63) 
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Q. I will ask you, Mr. McCullough, whether 
you have ever given Mr. Erickson any instruc-
tions-
I think probably the correct word was "di-
rections'' about leaving town, other than those 
that you have now related to the court1 
A. I have never given Mr. Erickson permis-
sion, as far as I am concerned, to leave town at 
any time. On the contrary, my admonitions were 
not to leave town until he saw me, and that was 
given to him at approximately 9 :30 on March 4th. 
There was nothing said about any subsequent 
communication after the day he had left town. My 
attention was nev.er called to any telephone con-
versation or about my having talked with him af-
ter that . ... 
679 MR. McCULLOUGH: I call your attention 
to page 76 ... (Ex. 12, p. 76) 
Q. Why did you tell Mr. Erickson that he 
would have to leave the state~ 
A. Because Mr. Wallace told me that was 
condition on his dismissing the action ... 
JUDGE LEWIS: If the court please, it 
seems to me that the witness is entitled to a little 
fairer treatment than that. He stated that on 
Thursday he told Erickson, in conforming to the 
requirements of the County Attorney, that he 
680 would have to leave town as a condition of the 
dismissal. Now he is asked why he told him on 
11 I 
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Saturday mormng that he would have to leave 
town. 
Judge Lewis apparently got the thing all 
mixed up-(continues quoting): 
THE COURT: I did not understand the ques-
tion that way. 
JUDGE LEvVIS: It was at the time of the 
order for the transfer to Judge Ellett. 
THE COURT : I did not understand his ques-
tion to be that. 
Then originally the record read '' (Question 
read)" but that was corrected by Mr. Otterstrom 
in his testimony and he said that the record was 
read, not the question read. The record was read. 
And, to sat£sfy the dispute between the court 
and Judge Lewis as to the last tim.e that week that 
I had talked to him, I stated: 
A. I never had any personal conversation 
with Mr. Erickson after Thursday morning at 
9:30. 
And that is where Mr. Ottersirom corrects 
the record now, by the way. 
MR. THOMAS: The only place he corrected 
it is that he says there, instead of " (Question 
read) " "Record read." 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Yes, and we had a dis-
cussion over it, and it was because Judge Lewis 
got all balled up as to which day it was, that I told 
him about the County Attorney saying that the 
man would have to leave, and this is a volunteer 
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681 statement, to satisfy Lewis and the. court just ex-
actly what the situation was. 
Cross Examination: 
I did not tell Judge Leverich anything about 
my telephone conversations with Erickson on the 
9th and 25th days of March. I did not consider it 
696 my duty to tell him or anyone else. Thes.e com-
munications were confidential. If I had been ask-
ed the question as to whether I had talked with 
Mr. Erickson I would have said yes, but would 
have declined to answ.er what the communications 
were. I never entertained any idea that they were 
asking whether I had any communication from Mr. 
Erickson either by telephone or otherwise after 
March 8th, and consequently I had nothing in my 
mind to differentiate between a telephone conver-
701 sation and a personal conversation. I made an 
effort to trace the long distance calls from Erick-
son but the telephone company informed me that 
the information was available only to the person 
placing the call and I could not get this informa-
697 tion. When I made the answer, "I don't know 
where he is now except by hearsay," at the con-
tempt hearing on April 14th, I had reference to 
Erickson's whereabouts at that time. I did not 
know personally whether he was in California on 
716 the 14th of April. I heard some rumors to the .ef-
fect that he was still in California which were 
716 hearsay. I revealed every part of the information, 
including what I had received from Erickson on the 
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719 telephone, to Judge Leverich, as to the where-
abouts of Erickson. I told Judge Leverich that I 
726 intended to go down to California and bring Erick-
son back bodily if necessary. 
Q. Let me ask you this: vVhy did you con-
sider just the events of that week at that time~ 
A. Because that is all I was asked about. That 
was the very first question that was asked me, 
with reference to the events of that week, and the 
entire discussion was on the events of that week, 
and there was no issue in the contempt proceed-
ing other than the events of that week. If you will 
read the Judge's findings of fact and conclusions 
of law and decree, there is nothing in issue except 
703 the events of that week. 
707 (Judgment of contempt read in evidence on 
page 707.) This judgment states that I failed to 
obey an order of the court made on the 24th day 
of February, 1937, to have Harry E. Erickson in 
court on the 4th day of March, 1937. (I was in 
the State of California on the 24th day of Feb-
ruary, 1937, and the County Attorney continued 
the case on the 24th of February to the 4th day 
of March, 1937). The other order I am supposed 
to have disobeyed was not having the defendant 
present in court on the 6th day of March, 1937. 
710 The contempt proceedings had nothing to do with 
anything else except these two orders. 
(The Disciplinary Committee indicated the 
testimony given by Harry E. Erickson in the per-
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jury case of" State of Utah, plaintiff vs. R. Verne 
McCullough, defendant," filed in the Third ,Judi-
cial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, Case 10540 (Exhibit G), had been 
successfully impeached by the defendant's wit-
nesses and in their Findings decided (Wery ma-
terial issue against the testimony of the said Harry 
E. Erickson, a convicted felon, and in favor of R. 
619 Verne McCullough. Therefore, the testimony of 
Harry E. Erickson will not be reviewed herein 
or the testimony of the following impeaching wit-
nesses offered by R. Verne McCullough: Elmer 
T. Ashton, Tr. 491, Jack Earl, Tr. 510, J. Leonard 
Love, Tr. 518, Nicholas G. Morgan, Tr. 546, Ralph 
B. Ottenheimer, Tr. 568, Elsie Gotez, Tr. 572, Lief 
McManus, Tr. 580, Marian Christensen, Tr. 593, 
Reed E. Callister, Tr. 614, Harold L. Gannett and 
Edna Gannett, Tr. 616, Mrs. R. Verne McCul-
lough, Tr. 620, and ,Jules Strongbow, page 425 
of "Exhibit G." Testimony offered for and 
against the charges not sustained by the Commis-
sion will not be reviewed.) 
STATEMENT OF LAW AND ARGUMENT 
Quantum of Proof Necessary in Disbarment Proceedings 
''The summary proceeding of disbarment is 
civil, not criminal, but requires more than a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. The guilt of the at-
torney must be cleaTly established." 
In Re Evans & Rogers, 22 Utah 367 
(first case) 
"We content ourselves with placing our con-
' 
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elusions upon the settled doctrine that unless a 
case is made out, by clear and convincing proof of 
guilt, no judgment of disbarment should go." 
People vs. Tanquary, 48 Colo. 124; 
109 Pac. 260. 
''An accusation against an attorney in a dis-
barment proceedings is in the nature of a crim-
inal charge, and all intendments are in favor of 
the accused, and he should be given the benefit of 
doubts arising from conflict of evidence.'' 
In Re Alameda County Bar Assn. (Calif.) 
170 Pac. 432 at 433. 
"The Court should never disbar a lawyer on 
testimony of a doubtful character, but the charges 
should be clearly sustained by convincing proof 
and the proof must satisfy the court with reas-
onable certainty." 
Thornton's Attorneys at Law, p. 1307 
"An attorney, against whom disbarment pro-
ceedings have been preferred, is presumed to be 
innocent and to have performed his duties faith-
fully and in accordance with his oath until the 
contrary is clearly established. 
Thornton's Attorneys at Law, p. 1309. 
In Re Haymond, 121 Cal. 385; 53 Pac. 809. 
TIME WITHIN WHICH PROCEEDINGS MUST 
BE INSTITUTED: 
As to the charges contained in Division I of this 
Brief, the Court's attention is directed to the time when 
the alleged offenses were committed; Subdivision (d)-
Wunderli, January 12, 1934, Subdivision (e)-Woodland, 
October 24, 1933; Subdivision (f)-York, October 13, 
1931. 
The undisputed evidence shows that the first time 
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these alleged offenses were called to the attention of the 
plaintiff was on January 21st, 1938, approximately 
four, five and seven years after the alleged misconduct. 
The record is silent as to any excuse or justification for 
the unreasonable delay in filing these charges. 
"The ordinary statutes of limitation have no 
application to disbarment proceedings. How.ever, 
proceedings instituted after a great lapse of time, 
from the commission of the act cmnplained of, are 
regarded with disfa1Jor and the Court may refuse 
to hear an application to disbar that has be,en un-
reasonably delayed." 
5 American .T uris. 434 
L. R. A. (1915 D) 1218; 
45 A. L. R. 1111 
2 Am. St. Rep. 860 (Lapse of 30 years). 
Proceedings dismissed on grounds of lapses 
of 5, 7 and 8 years after the misconduct occurred. 
Thornton's Attorneys at Law, p. 1299 
State vs. Clopton, 15 Missouri App. 589 
People vs. Allison, 68 Ill. 151 
People vs. Tanquary, 48 Colo. 122; 
109 Pac. 260. 
"There is another view that may be taken of 
this charge. Nearly 7 years have elapsed since the 
alleged misconduct. No explanation is given for 
the delay, and the law will not favor the institu-
tion of prosecutions of this character after the 
lapse of such a great length of time. The charge 
is a serious one, and if the respondent should be 
found guilty the consequences would be most dis-
astrous. The party whose rights are injuriously 
affected by the conduct of the character alleged, 
ought to be required to exhibit his information 
within a reasonable time, that the attorney impli-
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cated might be afforded an opportunity to make 
his defense while testimony for that purpose could 
be had.'' 
People vs. Allison, 68 Ill. 151 at 153. 
THERE IS NOT A SCINTILLA OF COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SHOW THAT 
R. VERNE McCULLOUGH SOLICITED EM-
PLOYMENT THROUGH ONE SID SPENCER. 
Plaintiff appreciates that under Rule IV of the Re-
vised Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, ap-
proved by the Supreme Court March 1, 1937, that" Hear-
ings shall be conducted in such a manner as shall best 
arrive at the truth'' but certainly no one will contend 
that such a rule will permit a finding of misconduct bas-
ed upon hearsay testimony. The courts have unanimous-
ly held that the rules and principles of evidence appli-
cable to civil proceedings are applicable to disbarment 
proceedings, and to be admissible the evidence must be 
relevant, competent and material. 
"The rules and principles of the law of evi-
dence applicable to civil proceedings are also ap-
plicable to disbarment proceedings, and the evi-
dence on either side must be such as is legally 
competent to maintain the issue." 
7 C. J. S. 781, cases cited Note 76-7 
See cases cited under Note 83 of 6 C. J. 607 
Thornton's Attorneys at Law, p. 1306. 
"We cannot approve of the course followed 
in the proceeding of admitting evidence without 
the application of those established rules govern-
ing such matters, and with which courts and law-
yers are, of course, familiar. While the Board of 
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Governors (California State Bar Association) 
has not been invested with judicial power, the in-
vestigation it is authorized by the State Bar Act 
to make in disciplinary matters is ancillary to 
and is a most important adjunct of the judicial 
review by this court of the decisions of the board . 
. . . vV e are of the view, therefore, that only legal 
evidence, as that term is understood among law-
yers, should receive the consideration of the 
Board of Governors and committees of the State 
Bar in the exercise of the disciplinary features of 
the Bar Act ... Hearsay and otherwise irrelevant 
and incompetent testimony should be eliminated." 
In Re Richardson, 209 Cal. 492, at 498; 
288 Pac. 669. 
"So, too, must a judgment fall for other er-
rors of law apparent on the face of the record, 
such as showing the judgment or the methods by 
which it was obtained to b.e at variance with the 
forms and practice of the court, or contrary to 
well recognized principles and fundamentals of 
the law. A fact apparent from the mandatory 
record showing that fundamental laW' was disre-
garded in the establishment of the judgment will 
render it null and void for all purposes." 
In Re Evans, 130 Pac. 217 at 225 
42 Utah 282 ( 2d case) 
"Testimony as to what third person had told 
witness with reference to respondents in disbar-
ment proceedings, held inadmissible as hearsay." 
In Re Sizer, 267 S. W. 922. 
The testimony offered by the prosecution in the 
Wunderli (d), ~Woodland (e) and York (f), cases per-
taining to the solicitation and employment of R. Verne 
' 
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McCullough through the alleged activities of Sid Spen-
cer, was incompetent, immaterial, irrelevant and hearsay 
and in nowise connected the plaintiff herein with any 
alleged misconduct. 
It is contended that Sid Spencer was the agent of 
the plaintiff in soliciting employment for three reasons: 
A. THAT THE DIRECT EVIDE~NCE ESTAB-
LISHES THE RELATION OE-. PRINCIPAL AND 
AGENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFE-. AND SPENCER. 
B. THAT THE RELATIONSHIP OF PLAIN-
TIFF AND SPENCER IN REGARD TO CIRCUM-
STANCES SURROUNDING HIS EMPLOYMENT 
AND OFFICE CONNECTIONS, JUSTIFIES A FIND-
ING THAT PLAINTIFF RATIFIED OR ACQUIES-
CED IN -WHATEVER SPENCER DID IN SOLICIT-
ING EMPLOYMENT FOR PLANTIFF, AND FOR 
THAT REASON PLAINTIFF IS CHARGED WITH 
COMPLICITY THEREIN AS A PRINCIPAL. 
C. THAT A CONSPIRACY EXISTED BE-
TWEEN PLAINTIFF AND SPENCER TO COMMIT 
THE UNLA-WFUL ACT OF SOLICITING EMPLOY-
MENT AND FOR THAT REASON ADMISSIONS 
AND DECLARATIONS OF SPENCER ARE BIND-
ING UPON PLAINTIFF. 
NOW AS TO "A" ON DIRECT AGENCY: 
There is not a line of testimony in the record to 
the effect that plaintiff said to anyone that the law firm 
of McCullough and Callister, or R. Verne McCullough, 
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as semor member of that firm, employed Sid Spencer 
to solicit business for them. There was no evidence of-
fered to the effect that plaintiff knew of any such con-
tract having been offered or received from any person. 
The evidence shows that Mr. and Mrs. \Vunderli 
and Mr. and Mrs. Woodland never talked to Mr. McCul-
lough about employment on their cases at any time. Clar-
ence York testified that Sid Spencer contacted him about 
employing the law firm of McCullough and Callister to 
prosecute his accident claim and that he, together with 
Shirley Erickson, Oren Swenson and Louise Christensen 
all signed the same contract for that purpose. This tes-
timony was thoroughly impeached by Soren C. Christen-
sen, Shirley Erickson, Louise Christensen Erickson and 
plaintiff. The significant thing in York's testimony was 
brought out in his direct .examination that he did 
not remember the name of plaintiff or McCullough 
and Callister being in the contract, and that he did 
not discuss with the plaintiff at any time this al-
leged contract of employment which he purport-
edly gave to Sid Spencer. (Tr. 167-8 and 170.) 
The witness testified (Tr. 169-80) that the only 
thing he discussed with Mr. McCullough was how the 
a.ccident happened. 
''It is well established that parties a.re not 
chargeable with the declarations of their agents, 
unless such declarations or statements ar.e made 
durin.g the transaction of business by the agent 
for the principal, and in relation to such business 
and within the scope of the agency; in other 
words, unless they may be deemed a part of the 
I,, 
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res gestae or stand as declarations of the prin-
cipal himself under recognized rules of the sub-
stantive law of the agency." 
Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Vol. II, 
Sec. 944, p. 1741-2. 
u As shown in the preceding section, before 
declarations or admissions of a servant or agent 
are admisS'ible against his master or principal, it 
must first appear that the act or statement in 
question was expr.essly or impliedly authorized. 
The first essential in this regard is proof of the 
fact of agency. And the act or statement may not 
be used to establish such fact. Agency must be 
proved aliunde. This rule is of long standing and 
universal recognition . .. And, as in the case of 
admissions of a partner or co-conspirator, the 
necessary foundation of proof of the existence of 
the relation of principal and agent between the 
admitting party and the party sought to be charg-
ed cannot be laid by mere proof of the admis-
sions of the agent as to the fact of his agency. 
Admissions of authority, made by the agent him-
self, are plainly not within the scope of his au-
thority as agent, and the introduction thereof in 
evidence would serv.e no useful purpose and only 
result in begging the issue. In fact, the declara-
tions of the alleged agent are not competent to 
prove such agency although they are accompani.ed 
by acts purporting to be acts of agency." 
Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Vol. II, 
Sec. 945, pages 17 45-8. 
The Disciplinary Committee which heard and re-
ceived the evidence in the case (page 2 of Findings of 
Fact) found: 
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"THE EVIDENCE DISCLOSED NO PER-
SONAL CONTACT BY DEFENDANT WITH 
ANY OF THE PERSONS SOLICITED NOR 
ANY DIRECT KNUWLEDGE ON HIS PART 
THAT SUCH SOLICITATION HAD BEEN 
MADE BY SPENCER IN ANY CASE.'' 
NOW AS TO "B," IMPLIED AGENCY OR 
AGENCY BY RATIFICATION: 
Plaintiff testified that during a period of approxi-
mately six years Sid Spencer occupied, as a sub-tenant, 
an adjoining office to the suite of McCullough and Cal-
lister in the Judge Building. (The arrangement shown 
by "Exhibit E ") That during said period Mr. Spencer 
paid one-third of the rent, one-third of the telephone bill 
and one-third of the stenographer's salary; that Mr. 
Spencer was listed under one of the same telephone num-
bers as McCullough and Callister. 
Prior to this office arrangement, Mr. Spencer had 
independent offices in the Deseret National Bank build-
ing. The evidence does not show that Mr. Spencer's 
name was on the door of the office of McCullough and 
Callister known as 734 Judge Building. The evidence 
shows that Mr. Spencer was an investigator and had 
been employed by other lawyers during the time he oc-
cupied his office in the Judge building; that during said 
period Mr. Spencer was employed at various times by 
the firm of McCullough and Callister in the investiga-
tion of evidentiary matters in damage suits, occasionally 
did stenographic work for them and was paid monies 
from time to time by said firm (a record of checks pro-
duced by plaintiff covering payments to Spencer ap-
I 
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peared in the transcript). Plaintiff testified that they 
did not pay Spencer for his work upon a per diem or 
other salary basis, but that he was paid for what his ser-
vices were reasonably worth in each case. Plaintiff de-
nied that Mr. Spencer was ever employed by him or Mc-
Cullough and Callister to solicit employment for them. 
The evidence shows that Mr. McCullough discon-
tinued the services of Mr. Spencer and terminated all 
office connections with him many months before the in-
stitution of these proceedings, upon the suggestion of 
Mr. Allan S. Tingey, the former President of the Utah 
State Bar Association, who thought the fact that Spencer 
was occupying an adjoining offce and had been employed 
as an investigator by plaintiff, seemed to lend color to 
rumors that Spencer was chasing cases. 
It was upon the foregoing facts, more particularly 
set out in the factual testimony in this Brief that the 
Disciplinary Committee made the following finding: 
"The disciplinary committee feels that the 
circumstances indicate that the defendant must 
have known that Spencer did engage in the so-
licitation of business for him, and whether he ex-
pressly authorized such conduct or not, must be 
held to have acquiesced in whatever Spencer did 
in that connection, and for that reason is charged 
with complicity therein as a principal." 
It is a ridiculous contention that an ethical attorney 
cannot employ an investigator to investigate evidentiary 
matters in damage suits. If such is the case a substan-
tial group of these insurance and railroad lawyers had 
better divorce their connections with adjusters and claim 
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agents who have been substantially responsible for the 
charges filed against plaintiff. 
In re Sizer, 306 Mo. 356, 267 S. W. 922, the court 
said: 
''Sizer and Gardner (lawyers) had as much 
right to employ investigators, not licensed to prac-
tice law, as the railroad or other corporations, 
through the legal department or otherwise, have 
to employ unlicensed persons as claim agents to 
look up evidence amd make adjustments of claims, 
if they could. Both would be within the law." 
It seems improbable that any fair minded person 
will say that an ethical lawyer may employ a person to 
investigate evidentiary matters, but if the lawyer rents 
a room to, such an investigator or permits his name to 
be listed on one of his telephones or pays him on the 
quantum meruit instead of on a per diem or salary basis, 
or if he hires him to do occasional stenographic or filing 
work, then such a lawyer becomes a principal with such 
a person in any unethical or unlawful act done without 
the knowledge of the principal and outside the scope of 
the agency of such investigator and without acceptation 
by the principal of the fruits of such alleged unethical 
activity. 
~r. L. 0. Thomas testified there were approximately 
154 cases filed by plaintiff in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County during the six years Mr. 
Spencer had office connections with plaintiff. Where in 
the record do we find evidence of acceptation by plaintiff 
of the fruits of any alleged unethical activities of Mr. 
Spencer? Your Honorable Court will have to ignore the 
r, 
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impeaching testimony of Soren C. Christensen, Louise 
Christensen Erickson, his daughter, Shirley Erickson, 
Oren M. Swenson (on cross-examination) and the plain-
tiff, and accept the testimony alone of Mr. Clarence York 
that he employed plaintiff upon the solicitation of Sid 
Spencer but without the knowledge of such solicitation 
by plaintiff, to make a finding that plaintiff was recip-
ient of the fruits of any alleged unethical activities of 
Mr. Spencer over that entire six year period. The York 
case was a trivial matter involving a settlement of $150, 
with a $50 fee. It was merely incidental to the case of 
Louise Christensen which came into plaintiff's office as 
ethically as any case was ever given to a lawyer. 
WOULD THE CONTRACT PURPORTED TO HAVE 
BEEN SIGNED BY YORK BE ENFORCEABLE 
AGAINST McCULLOUGH UNDER THE THE-
ORY THAT SPENCER WAS HIS AGENT? 
These would be the vital queries propounded by any 
compet.ent court : 
QUESTION: Where is the contract? 
ANSWER BY PLAINTIFF: We have never 
seen any such a contract and, therefore, cannot 
produce it. 
167 ANSWER BY MR. YORK: "I did not keep 
a copy of it." 
QUESTION: "Was the name of McCullough 
and Callister mentioned in the contract?" 
168 ANS~WER BY MR. YORK: "It has been a 
long time ago (1931); so I don't remember that." 
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QUESTION: "Do you recall any of the terms 
and conditions of the contract?'' 
ANSWER BY YORK: "Yes, that if they 
settled out of court they was to do it for one-third, 
and if they went to court they was to take fifty 
per cent of whatever the claim was they got from 
the railroad company.'' 
QUESTION: Who signed the contract? 
ANSWER BY MR. YORK: "We all put our 
names on the same piece of paper at Shirley Erick-
son's home at Orem, Utah, namely, Clarence York, 
Shirley Erickson, Oren Swenson," and "It seems, 
as I recollect, that her name (Louise Erickson) 
was on this same contract, whatever it was we 
signed." 
QUESTION: "Oh, you think she signed the 
same contract, too~" 
ANSWER : "Yes." 
169 FURTHER ANS\VER BY YORK: I never 
180 discussed this contract I signed for Spencer with 
McCullough at any time. 
I only signed one paper for Spencer and I 
did not sign anything for McCullough. I admit 
I signed Exhibit 4 which is not a contract but a 
statement of how the accident happened. 
254 ANSWER BY SHIRLEY ERICKSON: 
There was no such contract signed by me or any 
of the others in my presence. 
"Q. Did Mr. Spencer, at any time during that 
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conversation ever ask you, or anybody, any of the 
others to sign a contract to employ me? 
"A. No. sir. 
"Q. Did you sign a contract at that time, that 
Mr. Spencer handed you, to employ me? 
"A. No sir. 
"Q. Did you see any of the others s~gn any 
contract? 
"A. I did not. 
"Q. Did Mr. Spencer, in your presence, and 
~n the presence of those people, while you were 
there, mention anything about a contract to em-
ploy me? 
255 "A. No sir." ... 
"Q. I will ask you, Mr. Erickson, if Mr. Spen-
cer at any time, ever asked you, or marie any inti-
mation whatsoever about your coming to me, and 
employing me as your attorney? 
"A. No sir. 
'' Q. Let me call your attention again to the 
time that the two other boys and yourself were 
down at your house, two or three days after the 
accident. I think you said somewhere around the 
latter part of the week of the 11th-did you see 
any contracts exhibited to any of those boys, or 
260 did you see them sign a contract at that time? 
''A. No. There was none signed. 
'' Q. Was there anything signed except the 
longhand notes which Mr. Spencer took from you 
ther.e? 
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261 ''A. That was all.'' 
LOUISE ERICKSON testified as follows: 
"Q. Did Mr. Spencer at any time in your en-
tire experience in this particular case, ever ask 
you, or talk to you about employing me f 
279 ''A. No. 
"Q. Did he make any mention about employ-
ment, as far as I was concerned 1 
280 ''A. No, he did not; he never mentioned that." 
283-4 My father came to the hospital with a con-
tract to employ Mr. McCullough and I signed it 
278 at the hospital. I have a copy of it at home. 
224-5 ANSWER BY SOREN C. CHRISTENSEN: 
Mr. McCullough was recommended to me by Mrs. 
Michael, my daughter's landlady, a Mr. Draper, 
who formerly lived in Moroni and was then living 
in Salt Lake City, and a Mrs. Calder. On Tues-
day, October 13, 1931, my daughter and I signed 
the contract with Mr. McCullough. We were the 
only persons who signed this contract. On Wed-
nesday, October 14, 1931, (two days before Mr. 
Spencer interviewed the boys at Or em) Clarence 
Y ark, Oren Swenson and Shirley Erickson came 
down to the place I was staying and I told them 
that I had engaged Mr. McCullough as our attor-
ney to take care of my daughter's case and the 
226 boys told me they intended to support the girl 
(Louise Erickson) by all means and inasmuch as 
we had engaged Mr. McCullough they felt they 
would engaged him for their part of the affair too. 
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228 Clarence Y ark said at that time that inasmuch as 
we had engaged McCullough as our attorney that 
he felt like it was better that the rest of them en-
gage McCullmtgh to handle the case altogether. 
ANS-WER BY OREN M. s-WENSON: My 
829 brother is working for Clarence York in the bar-
ber shop at Orem. York and I were very close 
830 pals. I am positive the only paper I ever signed 
832 when Mr. Spencer was present was the one signed 
by Shirley Erickson and myself down in Orem. 
That is the only time Mr. Spencer ever contacted 
me wit? reference to signing a paper. I am sure 
that is correct as it is clear in my mind notwith-
standing it was some eight years ago. CWitness 
shown "Exhibit 7" containing his signature and 
that of Shirley Erickson, and "Exhibit 4" con-
taining signature of Clarence York. (Neither doc-
ument was a contract of employment but a state-
ment of how the accident occurreJ.) 
834 "Q. As a matter of fact, Mr. Swenson, isn't 
it a fact, without quibbling about the situation, 
that these are the three signatures to the two pieces 
of paper that were signed down in Orem when Mr. 
Spencer came down there? 
837 "Q. Isn't that true, Mr. Swenson? 
"A. Yes sir." Mr. Clarence York, Shirley 
Erickson and myself talked with Mr. Soren C. 
Christensen either Tuesday or \V ednesday fol-
lowing the Sunday the accident occurred and be-
fore we had seen Mr. Spencer. At that time Mr. 
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Christensen told us that he had been up to Mr. 
McCullough's office and had employed Mr. Mc-
Cullough to represent his daughter, Louise. 
ANSWER BY MR. McCULLOUGH: I did not 
have any written contract of employment with 
793 Clarence York, Shirley Erickson or Oren Swen-
son. They told me in my office that I had better 
take care of all their cases. I told them I would 
represent them on the same basis as I was repre-
senting Miss Christensen (Mrs. Erickson). The 
boys' injuries were trivial. Mr. York's doctor 
submitted a bill of $2.00. I went over the type-
written statement ,Exhibit 4) with Mr. York 
which he had signed. He offered no objections to 
the statement. Mr. York was very happy about 
797 the entire situation until he found out that Louise 
Christensen was not going to give him a cut of 
her $4500 vvhich she got. 
CERTAINLY NO ONE ~WOULD CONTEND THAT 
ANY COMPETENT COURT WOULD HOLD THAT 
SUCH A CONTRACT COULD BE ENFORCED 
AGAINST McCULLOUGH. 
"The authorities are unanirnmls in holding 
that there can be no ratification by acquiescence, 
silence, or faihtre to rep'ttdiate, 1mless the prin-
cipal has full and complete kno'wledge of oll the 
material facts attending the 1mauthorized trans-
action.'' 
Vol. II. 
American Jurisprudence, pp. 236 p. 190. 
See cases cited. 
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There is not a word of testimony that McCullough 
knew of the existence of any of these purported con-
tracts and the record is silent as to any knowledge on 
his part of the circumstances surrounding the alleged 
soliciting by Spencer of any such alleged contracts. It 
is ridiculous to claim that because Clarence York said 
he signed such a contract, therefore McCullough had 
knowledge that Spencer had solicited the contract for 
the reason Spencer was employed at various times during 
a period of six years as an investigator for McCullough. 
In the case of In Re Seidman, 240 N. Y. S. 592, the 
court held: "that the fact six cases had been obtained for 
attorney by solicitation over a period of five years did 
not make him chargeable, as matter of law, with notice 
of soliciting on part of his .employees, in disciplinary 
proceedings.'' 
"In order that a particular act or failure to 
act upon the part of the principal may be effec-
tive to ratify the una'Ldhorized act of another, 
certain conditions and factors entering into and 
surrounding the act of ratification are essential. 
To be effective, the principal must intend to rat-
ify the unauthorized act, he must have the power 
of ratifying the act done, he m1Jst ratify the trans-
action in its entirety, he must have knowledge of 
all the material facts surrmmding the transaction 
to be ratified, the person acting in an unauthor-
ized manner must purport to be acting in, the mat-
t.er on behalf of the principal, and the act itself 
must be capable of authorization." 
American Jurisprudence, Vol. II, p. 175, 
Sec. 220. 
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AS TO "C", ON THEORY OF CONSPIRACY, 
THE ADMISSIONS OF A CONSPIRATOR ARE 
BINDING UPON A CO-CONSPIRATOR. 
u It is a well settled principle of law that a 
conspiracy cannot be proved by admissions of one 
party thereto.'' 
Crites vs. St. Paul Ins. Co. (N. D.) 
200 N. W. 1016. 
"The underlying principle of the rule has 
been well expressed as follows: 'When an unlaw-
ful conspiracy or combination is established, ev-
erything said, written or done by either of the 
conspirators in the execution or furtherance of 
the common purpose is deemed to have been said, 
done, or written by every one of them, and may 
be proved against each and all of them.' But in 
such cases it must first be proved, by other evi-
dence, that a conspiracy existed at the time the 
declarations were made. Moreover, the mere de-
clarations of one of the alleged conspirators are 
not competent for this purpose, unless they form 
a part of the res gestae. Even if a conspiracy is 
shown aliunde, the declarations of one conspira-
tor are not admissible against the others, if made 
after the common design is accomplished or aban-
doned.'' 
Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Vol. II, 
Sec. 943, p. 17 40. 
" • Before statements of one alleged conspir-
ator are admissible in evidence against his alleged 
co-conspirator, the party offering the same must 
fit·st make md a prima facie case of conspiracy 
aliunde and, ~uhen such a prima facie case is made 
out, then the statements of one conspirator made 
during the pendency of the wrongful enterprise, 
before its consummation, and in furtherance of 
i' 
I 
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its object, will be received in evidence against his 
co-conspirator.' Campbell vs. Newton, 52 Okl. 517; 
152 P. 841 (syllabus by the court.)" 
Footnote to foregoing citation (p. 1740, 
Vol. II Jones Comm. on Ev.) 
IN THE CASE AT BAR THERE IS NOT A 
SCINTILLA OF EVIDENCE OF ANY CONSPIRACY 
EXCEPT THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF THIRD 
PARTIES WHO TESTIFIED TO ALLEGED CON-
VERSATIONS WITH SPENCER \VHICH ARE 
NEVER ADMISSIBLE UNTIL THE CONSPIRACY 
IS SHOWN ALIUNDE. 
Plaintiff does not admit that any of these 
alleged conversations were held with Mr. Sid 
Spencer. We do not wish to impune the good 
motives of Mr. and Mrs. \Vunderli or Mr. and 
Mrs. Woodland. That some person talked to these 
people we will admit but whether that person was 
Sid Spencer is very questionable. Mr. Fritz Wun-
derli described this mysterious Spencer as a 
neighbor of his in Highland Park. (Mr. Spencer 
never lived in Highland Park in his life.) That 
294 he did not remember his name until he was shown 
affidavit he signed for the Union Pacific claim 
agent. That he could not tell whether Spencer was 
dark or light complexioned. That he could not 
describe him when he talked with Mr. McCullough 
295 at the Beau Brummel Cafe before the hearing and 
290 he could not describe Spencer at the hearing ex-
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cept he was taller and younger than he (Mr. Wun-
derli.) That this man did not offer him a contract 
296 to ~ign at any time. ThaL the man only came once 
(Jan. 12, 1934) and he has never seen him since. 
292 (Spencer has lived and worked here ever since.) 
MR. vV. T. ~WOODLAND testified that this 
man came to his home October 24, 1933, said his 
188 name was Spencer, did not remember his first 
name. First thought he was an insurance agent. 
192 He never saw the man after that morning. The 
only thing he remembered about him was that he 
was tall and dark complexioned. (Spencer is ex-
207 tremely light complexioned.) 
MRS. LYDIA vVOODLAND : This man had 
a paper and on the bottom of the paper was "S' ~ 
''Spencer.'' He was fair faced, light complexioned 
211 and about as tall as Mr. Thomas. (Thomas is 
217 about 5 feet 8 inches; Sid Spencer is 6 feet 2 in-
ches.) I cannot recall the name of McCullough and 
Callister or McCullough being on the paper at all. 
About an hour after the man had gone, an attor-
ney came and left me his card sho~wing he was 
218 officing in the Kearns building. The person's 
218 name on the card was not McCullough or Callis-
ter. This attorney was not McCullough. (McCul-
lough did not office in the Kearns building.) 
We certainly have a marked variety of de-
scriptions of this man Spencer. It may be that the 
insurance adjusters and railroad claim agents who 
obtained affidavits in each of these cases can dis-
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close more about the identity of the man claiming 
to be Spencer. 
The Court's attention is called to the charges 
set out in (b) of Paragraph III of the complaint, 
wherein R. Verne McCullough was charged with 
personally soliciting employment from one J. A. 
Nelson. Mr. L. 0. Thomas, at the instance of an-
other lawyer, secured an affidavit from Nelson 
that McCullough had personally solicited employ-
ment from him. After an investigation which de-
termined that J. A. Nelson did not even know 
McCullough, MR. THOMAS TOLD THE DIS-
CIPLINARY COMMITTEE THAT "I vVAS 
CONVINCED IN MY UWN MIND THAT IT 
\VAS NOT MR. McCULLOUGH THAT SOLIC-
391 ITED THE CASE." McCullough insisted that 
the charge be not dismissed until Nelson testified 
before the Committee and explained how such an 
affidavit was obtained; that such testimony would 
probably throw a lot of light on how the rest of 
these affidavits were secured. McCullough de-
manded that Nelson be brought before the Com-
mittee so that full disclosure be made as to why 
that affidavit was signed and who suggested that 
Verne McCullough's name be put into the affi-
davit. This request was refused. Mr. Thomas said 
393 he received word from two or three sources to 
the effect that Mr. McCullough had been to the 
Nelson home and solicited business. Plaintiff de-
manded the source of his information but he re-
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294 fused to give it on the ground it was confidential. 
The Court's attention is further directed to 
the dismissal of charges of solicitation in subdi-
vision (c) in which R. Verne McCullough was 
charged with soliciting employment from one Mrs. 
Madge Masters through his agent, Sid Spencer. 
Mrs. Madge Masters was subpoenaed as a witness. 
She appeared before the Disciplinary Conm1ittee 
and -vvas sworn as a witness for the prosecution. 
4-5 The prosecution dropped the charge on the pre-
text that the witness became sick after the hear-
942 ing began. 
The Court's attention is particularly directed 
to the testimony of Mrs. Selma Richey, a witness 
called by the prosecution, to support another of 
these fake charges filed against McCullough (sub-
division (i) Paragraph III of complaint-attempt 
subornation.) 
"Q. How many times did Mr. Thomas come 
up to your apartment and ask you to sign affi-
davits which you read and which were not true? 
152 "A. Oh-
,' MR. YOUNG: Well, that assumes a fact, 
doesn't it? 
"MR. McCULLOUGH: Well, she can state 
if he didn't come up. I will lay the foundation. 
"Q. Did Mr. Thomas come up to your apart-
ment at any time with affidavits which were not 
true, and ask you to sign them? 
"A. Yes sir. 
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'' Q. How many times did he come up with 
those false affidavits and ask you to sign them? 
152 "A. I believe three times, if I am not mis-
taken.'' 
(It seems the charges were sustained against 
Thomas instead of McCullough.) 
AS TO DIVISION II, SUED. (g) SOLICITING 
EMPLOYMENT FROM KATHERINE SUTFIN: 
THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE WHO 
HEARD THE WITNESSES TESTIFY AND 
RECEIVED ALL THE EVIDENCE OFFERED 
BY THE PROSECUTION AND THE DE-
FENSE HELD THAT THE EVIDENCE DID 
NOT SUSTAIN THE CHARGE. (Findings (g), 
p. 2). The Board of Commissioners of the Utah 
State Bar, for reasons unknown to plaintiff, re-
versed the Findings of the Disciplinary Committee 
on this charge without any additional evi:lence 
having been offered or received by them. 
44 Five witnesses were called, namely, Homer 
57 E. Grove, Gerald Blake, Ellis J. Pickett, Ben 
74 Lingenfelter and R. Verne McCullough. The tes-
435 timony of all these witnesses is carefully abstract-
799 ted in this Brief. (Br. p. 46-60.) 
The undisputed facts in evidence show : 
1. That on the 7th day of October, 1935, at 
440 the request of Mrs. Katherine Sutfin, Ben Lin-
genfelter telephoned plaintiff from St. George 
stating that he had been requested by Mrs. Hail 
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and Mrs. Sutfin to call McCullough and have him 
come down about an accident in which Mr. Sutfin 
had been killed. 
2. That Mrs. Sutfin waited in St. George for 
442 McCullough until after midnight of October 7th 
451 before leaving with Gerald Blake, her two chil-
dren and Mr. Sutfin's body for Phoenix, Arizona, 
800 via Las Vegas, Nevada. 
3. That McCullough went down to St. George 
arriving there about an hour and a half or two 
hours after Mrs. Sutfin left for Las Vegas; that 
he first talked to Mrs. Hail at the Liberty Hotel, 
who told him that Mrs. Sutfin had requested that 
799 she telephone McCullough and that Mrs. Sutfin 
had waited practically all night and had conclud-
800 ed McCullough was not coming when she left for 
Phoenix. 
4. Mrs. Hail advised McCullough that Mr. 
Lingenfelter was at the checking station at Santa 
440 Clara. McCullough went to the checking station 
800 to talk with Mr. Lingenfelter who stated that Mrs. 
Sutfin had waited for McCullough until after mid-
night but she had gone on about an hour and a 
half before; McCullough told Mr. Lingenfelter 
that he was sorry but he could not get there sooner. 
5. Mr. Lingenfelter then suggested that he 
would call the Sheriff at Las Vegas to have him 
intercept Mrs. Sutfin and tell her McCullough was 
on the road to Las Vegas. 
802 6. Mr. Lingenfelter put in a call to the sheriff 
108 
442 of Las Vegas and told him that the attorney Mrs. 
Sutfin had requested to come down from Salt Lake 
was on the road over there and asked the sheriff 
if he would give that information to Mrs. Sutfin 
who was traveling in a truck with her two l:ttle 
children, a young man and her husband's corpse. 
Lingenfelter told the sheriff McCullough would 
meeet her at the police station. McCullough was 
reluctant to go to Las Vegas as he had been trav-
456 eling all night. 
7. At Las Vegas Mrs. Sutfin told McCul-
lough she had not employed Ellis J. Pickett or 
any other lawyer and she told him she would not 
employ any lawyer until after she talked to her 
63-73 people at Phoenix (see particularly testimony of 
Gerald Blake abstracted herein). 
79-80 Pickett testified Mrs. Sutfin employed him 
but Mrs. Sutfin denied it in a letter to Mrs. Hail 
cited by Pickett in his letter ("Exhibit 1 ") to 
Mrs. Sutfin's attorneys at Phoenix. 
63 8. Mrs. Sutfin approved of Mr. McCullough 
803 making an investigation of fact at St. George on 
his way back to Salt Lake and requested him to 
correspond with her at Phoenix in care of Mr. 
Max McLeary, Southern Pac. Railroad Co. Mc-
Cullough made the investigation and on returning 
808 to Salt Lake sent Mrs. Sutfin a letter ("Exhibit 
18") explaining what he had done. (We recom-
mend these letters be read.) On October 16th, 
1935, McCullough received a letter ("Exhibit 19") 
109 
from Mrs. Sutfin's attorneys, Lewkowitz and Zav-
ersack, stating they had been employed by Mrs. 
Sutfin and thanking McCullough on behalf of Mrs. 
813 Sutfin for the many kindnesses he had shown her. 
808 9. On Nov. 30, 1935, McCullough received a 
telegram ("Ex. 17") from Mrs. Sutfin stating she 
had discharged her Arizona attorneys and asked 
McCullough to come to St. George. McCullough 
sent a letter ("Exhibit 20") to Mrs. Sutfin re-
questing her to come to Salt Lake. On Dec. 9, 
1935, Mrs. Sutfin signed a contract ("Exhibit 
22 ") employing McCullough to represent her. 
Mrs. Sutfin gave McCullough Lewkowitz and Zav-
ersack's file and a letter of withdrawal from them. 
How any fair minded board could make any 
other finding than was done by the Disciplinary 
Committee is beyond credence. The fact that Mr. 
Grove may have misunderstood instructions from 
his superior officer or the fact that the sheriff 
himself was not clear as to what Mr. Lingenfelter 
requested, cannot in any conceivable manner be 
charged against plaintiff. McCullough acted in 
good faith in every step of this entire case and 
there is not a word of evidence to impune his good 
motives and ethical conduct. 
NOW AS TO DIVISION III, SUBD. (1) AND (m): 
These charges are set out in full on page 64 
and 65 herein. 
Both of these charges are centered in the tes-
timony given by McCullough in the contempt pro-
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ceedings filed against him in the City Court of 
Salt Lake City, before Honorable B. P. Leverich, 
Judge, in the matter entitled, The State of Utah 
Ex Rel B. P. Leverich versus R. Verne McCul-
lough (Transcript thereof Ex. 12). We particu-
larly request the court to re-read McCullough's 
testimony abstracted on page 65 of this brief. 
The gravamen of the charge in Subd. (1) is 
as follows: 
"That thereafter, although the said R. 
Verne McCullough well knew the whereabouts 
of the said Harry E. Erickson in the State of 
California, the said R. Verne McCullough re-
fused and failed to divulge to the court or to 
the sheriff's office or to the office of the Salt 
Lake County Attorney the whereabouts of the 
said Harry E. Erickson." 
In the contempt proceedings McCullough was 
charged with failure to obey two orders of the 
court. The one made on the 24th day of February, 
1937, to have Harry E. Erickson in court on the 4th 
day of March, 1937, and the other, to have the de-
fendant present in court on the 6th day of March, 
1937, and that McCullough wilfully disobeyed and 
resisted said orders in that he wilfully counseled 
and advised the said Harry E. Erickson to remove 
himself from the jurisdiction of the court. (See 
707 the Findings and Judgment of contempt on file 
herein.) 
IF McCULLOUGH WAS GUILTY OF CON-
TEMPT, TH5 OFFENSE WAS COMPLETE 
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ON MARCH 6th, 1937, WHEN HARRY E. 
ERICKSON DID NOT APPEAR IN JUDGE 
679 LEVERICH'S COURT ON THAT DATE. (Con-
curred in by Mr. Dobbs.) THERE WAS NO IS-
SUE IN THOSE PROCEEDINGS ON ANY MAT-
TER SUBSEQUENT TO THAT TIME. McCUL-
LOUGH WAS NOT CHARGED IN THE CON-
TEMPT PROCEEDINGS, AS CHARGED 
HEREIN, WITH FAILURE AND REFUSAL 
TO DIVULGE TO THE COURT OR TO THE 
SHERIFF'S OFFICE OR TO THE OFFICE 
OF THE SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
THE WHEREABOUTS OF HARRY E. ERICK-
SON AFTER HE LEFT THE JURISDICTION 
OF THE COURT ON MARCH 6, 1937. 
McCullough was charged in paragraph III, 
Subd. (k) of the complaint herein that on the 5th 
day of March, 1937, "he advised and counseled 
Harry E. Erickson to immediately leave the state 
of Utah, although the said R. Verne McCullough 
well knew at said time that the said criminal ac-
tion was pending before the aforesaid court." 
The Disciplinary Committee and the Board 
of Commissioners in their findings held that the 
evidence did not sustain this charge. 
"K" 
"The Disciplinary Committee finds that the 
charges made herein of advising and consulting 
the said Harry E. Erickson to leave the state of 
Utah are not sustained herein.'' 
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The Board of Commissioners m paragraph 
three, page 2, of their findings held: 
"The Commissioners find from the evidence 
presented that the charges specifically set forth 
in paragraph 3, subdivisions (a), (b), (c), (h), (i), 
(j) and (k) are not sustained, and for that reason 
the Commissioners recommend that each of said 
charges be dismissed." 
The only issue left to consider in the contempt 
proceedings is the alleged disobedience of Mc-
Cullough to the two orders of Judge Leverich in 
not having Erickson present in court March 4th 
and March 6th, 1937. How can McCullough be in 
wilful disobedience to these orders of Judge Lev-
erich when the abovementioned findings exoner-
ates him from ''wilfully counseling and advising 
Erickson to remove himself from the jurisdiction 
fo the court 1 '' Surely no thinking person would 
say that because a defendant in a criminal action 
jumps his recognizance without aid or complicity 
from his lawyer, and removes himself from the 
jurisdiction of the court, that such lawyer is guilty 
of contempt in failing to have defendant present 
in court because the lawyer was instrumental in 
getting the defendant released without bail. vVho 
ever heard of a bondsman being found guilty of 
contempt because a defendant jumped his bond 
without the knowledge of the bondsman 1 
Is it fair or just to charge McCullough in 
these proceedings with alleged misconduct in fail-
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ing to divulge to Judge Leverich the wher.eabouts 
of Erickson after he left the jurisdiction of the 
court on March 6, 1937, and then determine the 
truth or falsity of that charge from McCullough's 
testimony given in a contempt proceedings where 
no such issue was ever raised or even contem-
plated? 
EVEN WITHOUT SUCH AN ISSUE, A 
PROPER ANALYSIS OF McCULLOUGH'S 
TESTIMONY IN THE CONTEMPT PROCEED-
INGS CLEARLY SHOWS THAT HE GAVE 
TO THE COURT IN ANSWER TO THE IM-
MATERIAL QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED TO 
HIM AT THE CONTEMPT HEARING ON 
APRIL 13, 1937, ALL THE INFORMATION 
HE HAD AS TO THE WHEREABOUTS OF 
HARRY E. ERICKSON. 
McCullough's testimony is replete with state-
ment after statement that Erickson was in Cali-
fornia with relatives. See abstract of his testi-
mony on page 65 of this brief. 
The Disciplinary Committee in their findings 
(p. 5) found that the evidence did not show Mc-
Cullough knew the address and telephone number 
of Erickson at Riverside on April13, 1937. There 
is not a word of information given McCullough 
in the station to station phone calls from Erickson 
on March 9th and 25th concerning the where-
I 
'l 
I· 
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abouts of Erickson which had not been given to 
the court through the answers of numerous ques-
tions asked McCullough by Judge Leverich and 
counsel. 
vV e contend these telephone messages from 
Erickson were confidential and privileged com-
munications. The reiterations of these conversa-
tions by McCullough would have disclosed the 
confidential secrets of Erickson of why he left 
the jurisdiction of the court, his reluctance to re-
turn, his incorrect assumption that Standings con-
trolled the prosecution and the right of extradi-
tion, the fact that he was going under an assumed 
name, the element of flight and other matters, the 
disclosure of which would have jeopardized the 
substantial rights of the defendant when tried. 
Subdivision 5 of Rule II of the Revised Rules 
of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar, 
reads: 
"It is the duty of an attorney and coun-
selor: To maintain inviolate the confidence, 
and, at every peril to himself, to pr.eserve the 
secrets of his client." 
''Statements regarding the commission of a 
crime already committed, made by the party 
committing it to an attorney at law when con-
sulting him in that capacity, are privileged 
communications; and this is true even though 
the purpose of the interview was to devise 
means to escape the consequences of the 
crime.'' 
Thornton on Attorneys at Law, page 214; 
Alexander vs. U. S., 138 U. S. 353. 
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Opinion No. 23, May 1930, American Bar Associa-
tion Journal : 
"Confidences of a Client; Duty of em Attor-
ney to Protect the Confidence of a Client. 
"A member of the Association asks the Com-
mittee to express its opinion regarding the duty 
of an attorney to disclose to the prosecuting au-
thorities, the whereabouts of a fugitive client. The 
facts as stated are that prior to the trial, the cli-
ent fled and went into hiding, his bond was for-
feited and the court issued a warrant for his ar-
rest, his relatives requested the attorney to en-
deaver to find him and gave the attorney confi-
dential information as to places where he might 
be found, and the attorney eventually located him 
and advised him to return and surrender, which 
he eventually did. The question presented is 
whether it was the duty of the attorney, under the 
circumstances, to inform the officials as to his 
client's hiding place, or whether such information 
is one of those confidences of a client which the 
profession is ethically bound to respect. 
"The Committee's opinion was stated by Mr. 
Gallert. 
"It is in the public interest that even the 
worst criminal should have counsel, and counsel 
cannot properly perform their duties without 
knowing the truth. To hold that an attorney 
should reveal confidential information which he 
has obtained, by virtue of his professional employ-
ment from members of the family of a criminal, 
would prevent such frank disclosure as might be 
necessary to a proper protection of the client's 
interest.'' 
It is contended McCullough should have claimed the 
privilege of not disclosing these telephone communica-
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tions. How can you claim a privilege from stating a con-
versation when you are never asked about the conversa-
tion~ McCullough was questioned as to the whereabouts 
of Erickson. We submit his answers detailed every bit 
of information he had. If McCullough had told the court 
of these confidential telephone communications, such 
fact would not have added anything to the information 
already given to the court. 
"The right to privilege from disclosure to 
which communications between attorney and cli-
ent are entitled, belongs to the client, and not to 
the attorney, and therefore, the client may re-
nounce or waive it at his pleasure." 
Thornton on Attorneys at Law, p. 221. 
The quoted testimony of McCullough in the Findings 
of the Disciplinary Committee and the Board of Com-
missioners, is badly garbled. Answers are isolated from 
one part of the contempt transcript and so placed as to 
appear in answer to questions taken from an entirely 
different part of the transcript. Both questions and an-
swers are misquoted notwithstanding they are set off 
with quotation marks indicating direct quotations from 
the transcript. 
The quotation, as it appears on page 11 of the Find-
ings of the Board of Commissioners, cannot be found 
any place in the contempt transcript. It was copied from 
the complaint herein (p. 7). We would recommend that 
the Court read the testimony of Mr. McCullough as care-
fully abstracted in this brief. 
Subdivision (m) is a charge of perjury on matters 
pertaining to the case of State of Utah versus Harry E. 
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Erickson. The gravamen of this charge is that R. Verne 
McCullough testified falsely in the contempt hearing be-
fore Judge Leverich on April 13, 1937, and in said testi-
mony did state as true matter in substance as follows: 
'' 'I told Erickson not to leave before he saw 
Oli\'." 
'' 'I didn't see Erickson agam or talk with 
him again after the morning of Thursday, the 4th 
of March'.'' 
" 'I don't know where Erickson is except 
that I was informed that he had relative:'~ some 
place in California, and I imagine that he is with 
them'." 
"That in truth and in fact the said R. V eme 
McCullough did see and did talk to Harry E. Er-
ickson on the 5th day of March, 1937, and did then 
advise and counsel the said Harry E. Erickson to 
immediately leave the State of Utah. 
"That in truth and in fact the said R. Verne 
McCullough knew the address and telephone nnm-
ber of the said Harry E. Erickson in Riverside, 
California, at the time the said R. Verne McCul-
lough testified on the said 13th day of April, 
1937." 
THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE MADE 
THIS FINDING (page 5) IN REFERENCE TO THAT 
TESTIMONY: 
'' 'I told Erickson not to leave before he snw 
me.' 
"THE DISCIPLINARY COMMFl'TEE 
FINDS THAT THE FOREGOING STATE-
1fENT WAS AND IS TRUE; that at said time 
and place the defendant further testified as fol-
lows: 
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'' 'I did not see Erickson again or talk with 
him again after the morning of Thursday the 4th 
of March.' 
" 'I don't know where Erickson is except that 
I was informed that he had relatives some place 
in California and I imagine that he is with them.' 
''It is charged that R. Verne McCullough 
saw and talked with Harry E. Erickson on the 5th 
day of March, 1937, and then advised and coun-
seled him to immediately leave the State of Utah; 
and further that the address and telephone num-
ber of the said Harry E. Erickson at Riven;ide, 
California, were known to the said McCullough at 
the time he testified on April 13, 1937. 
"The first of the two statements above quot-
ed was claimed by the defendant to have been 
made at the termination of a line of testimony and 
in reference to a period ending on March 7th and 
his connection with Erickson during that period. 
The disciplinary committee finds that Mr. Mc-
Cullough did not see or talk to Harry E. Erickson 
on the 5th day of March, 1937, and did not on that 
date advise or counsel him to leave the State of 
Utah, but that on the 4th day of March, 1937, he 
had told Erickson that the latter must leav.e the 
State of Utah as a condition imposed in connec-
tion with the dismissal of the prosecution pending 
against Erickson, and further advised him not to 
leave until he, Erickson, had seen McCullough. 
The disciplinary committee is not satisfied from 
the evidence that McCullough knew the address 
and telephone number of Erickson at Riverside on 
April 13, 1937, but is satisfied from the evidence 
that McCullough did know how to get in contact 
with Erickson on April13, 1937, and so finds the 
fact to be. '' 
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In the case of State of Utah versus R. Verne Mc-
Cullough, filed in the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, No. 10540~ McCullough 
was charged with the same identical acts of perjury as 
set forth herein. After a ten day trial in which evidence 
was taken covering more than five hundred pages, Judge 
James W. McKinney of that court directed the jury to 
return a verdict of not guilty at the close of the State's 
case. Surely with that record and with all the defense 
testimony from some fourteen witnesses, including plain-
tiff herein, offered and received at the hearing before 
the Disciplinary Committee, no other verdict could be 
found from the evidence. 
THE FOLLOWING TESTIMONY AS 
QUOTED IN CHARGE (m) AND COPIED IN 
BOTH SETS OF FINDINGS, CANNOT BE 
FOUND IN THAT LANGUAGE IN THE EN-
TIRE CONTEMPT TRANSCRIPT: 
"I didn't see Erickson again or talk with 
him again after the morning of Thursday, the 4th 
day of March." 
"I don't know where Erickson is except that 
I was informed th(Lt he lwd rel(Ltives some place 
in C (Llifornia, (Lnd I imagine th(Lt he is with them." 
In reference to the first quoted ( 1) statement, 
we again call the court's attention to the testi-
mony of McCullough in the disbarment proceed-
ings: 
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678 "Now, I want to call the Commission's at-
tention to two or three things that I think my 
testimony should contain: When I was put on di-
rect-examination by Judge Lewis he asked me the 
question: (Ex. 12, page 51) 
" 'Q. Do you remember the incidents that oc-
curred during the week beginning March the 1st 
and ending March the 8th, with reference to one 
Erickson who was under arrest?' And that is the 
subject matter which we were discussing at the 
time of the contempt proceedings. And when this 
controversy arose is related here in the transcript. 
When I made the answer to the question : 
'Q. Did you have any direct communication 
with him at any time after the morning of Thurs-
day, March the 5th? 
" 'A. No. I never talked with Mr. Erickson 
after the morning of Thursday, March the 4th, at 
9 o'clock, 9:20 or 9:30 in the morning,'-! had ref-
erence at that time to the detailing of the events 
of the particular week prior to the time Harry 
Erickson left town on Saturday morning. 
"MR. DOBBS: Your position is that that 
must be considered in connection with its text, and 
if the text shows-and that the nature of the ques-
tions then being asked you was of the character 
to lead you to believe that you were not being in-
terrogated with respect to anything occurring 
after March 6th 1 
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678 "MR. McCULLOUGH: I wasn't even asked 
anything after that. 
"MR. HANSEN: At that time the offense 
of contempt was complete, if he was guilty of con-
tempt. 
''MR. DOBBS: Yes. 
"MR. McCULLOUGH: 
(Reads.) (Ex. 12, page 63): 
Next question: 
" 'Q. I will ask you, Mr. McCullough, wheth-
er you have ever given Mr. Erickson any instruc-
tions'-
"I think probably the correct word was 'di-
rections,' 'about leaving town, other than those 
you have now related to the court~ 
" 'A. I have never given Mr. Erickson per-
mission, as far as I am concerned, to leave town 
at any time. On the contrary, my admonitions 
were not to leave town until he saw me, and that 
was given to him at approximately 9:30 on March 
4th.' 
''There was nothing said about any subse-
quent communication after the day he had left 
town. My attention was never called to any tele-
phone conversation or about my having talked 
679 with him after that." ... 
'' 'Q. ~Why did you tell Mr. Erickson that he 
would have to leave the state~' 
" 'A. Because Mr. Wallace told me that was 
a condition on his dismissing the action.' 
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"'JUDGE LEWIS: If the court please, it 
seems to me that the witness is entitled to a little 
fairer treatment than that. He stated that on 
Thursday he told Erickson, in conforming to the 
requirements of the County Attorney, that he 
would have to leave town as a condition of the 
680 dismissal. Now he is asked why he told him on 
Saturday morning that he would have to leave 
town.' 
"Judge Lewis apparently got the thing all 
mixed up.-(Continues quoting): 
'' 'THE COURT: I did not understand the 
question that way. 
" 'JUDGE LEWIS: It was at the time of the 
order for the transfer to Judge Ellett. 
" 'THE COURT: I did not understand his 
question to be that.' 
''Then originally the record read ' (Question 
read.) '; but that was corrected by Mr. Otterstrom 
in his testimony, and he said that the record was 
read, not the question read. The record was read. 
"And to satisfy the dispute between the court 
and Judge Lewis as to the last time that week that 
I had talked to him, I stated: 
" 'A. I never had any personal conversation 
with Mr. Erickson after Thursday morning at 
9:30.' 
''And that is where Mr. Otterstrom corrects 
the record now, by the way. 
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"MR. THOMAS: The only place he corrected 
it is that he says there, instead of '(Question 
read.) ' 'Record read.' 
"MR. McCULLOUGH: Yes, and we had a 
discussion over it, and it was because Judge Lewis 
got all balled up as to which day it was, that I 
told him about the County Attorney saying that 
the man would have to leave, and this is a volun-
teer statement, to satisfy Lewis and the court just 
681 exactly what the situation was." 
This testimony refers to that given by Mc-
Cullough on pages of the contempt transcript 
(Exhibit 12) 51, 63 and 76. 
THE SECOND QUOTED ( ~) STATEMENT 
ABOVE SET FORTH: 
''I don't know where Erickson is except that 
I was informed that he had relatives some place 
in California, and I imagine that he is with them.'' 
WAS NEVER SAID BY McCULLOUGH AND 
THIS STATEMENT CANNOT BE FOUND 
ANY PLACE IN THE ENTIRE CONTEMPT 
TRANSCRIPT. 
There is not a scintilla of direct testimony or 
a circumstance surrounding the contempt proceed-
ings which contradicts the intendment of McCul-
lough that the statement; "I never had any per-
sonal conversation with Mr. Erickson after Thurs-
day morning at 9 :30" (March 4th )-was made in 
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detailing the events of the week prior to Harry 
Erickson leaving town. 
The Supreme Court of California said: 
"AN ACCUSATION AGAINST AN AT-
TORNEY IN A DISBARMENT PROCEED-
INGS IS IN THE NATURE OF A CRIMINAL 
CHARGE, AND ALL INTENDMENTS ARE 
IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED, AND HE 
SHOULD BE GIVEN THE BENEFIT OF 
DOUBTS ARISING FROM CONFLICT OF 
EVIDENCE.'' 
In Re Alameda County Bar Assn. (Calif.) 
170 Pac. 432 at 433. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that these 
two telephone conversations from Erickson on 
March 9th and 25th had been material to the is-
sues in the contempt proceedings, what would Mc-
Cullough have to gain in not disclosing them to 
the court. 
McCullough did not seduce the 13 year old 
child. McCullough did not counsel or advise Er-
ickson to absent himself from the jurisdiction of 
the court (Definitely determined in F;inding 
(k)); "It was to McCullough's financial interest 
to have him stay and McCullough had no motive 
to have Erickson absent himself at any time." 
(Contempt Transcript p. 65). Every act done 
and statement made by McCullough definitely in-
dicated his desire to get Erickson back in the jur-
isdiction of the court. These telephone communi-
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cations were not material to the issues in the con-
tempt proceedings but even assuming they were 
and that McCullough's attention had been called 
to them, there is no motive, reflected by the en-
tire record, for McCullough not to disclose these 
communications except "To maintain inviolate 
the confidence, and, at every peril to himself, to 
preserve the secrets of his client." (Rule 5). 
The only contempt of court which R. Verne McCul-
lough could be charged with arose in connection with the 
prosecution of one Harry E. Erickson, charged with the 
crime of carnal knowledge of a female over the age of 
13 years and under the age of 18 years, in violation of 
Title 103, Chapter 51, Section 19, of the Revised Statutes 
of Utah, 1933. The complaint in that case was signed 
by Lawrence Standing as complaining witness and B. P. 
Leverich, City Judge and ex officio justice of the peace 
in and for Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. The crime charged in said complaint is a felony 
and B. P. Leverich, City Judge and ex officio justice 
of the peace, as aforesaid, was acting as a committing 
magistrate in conducting the prosecution of said defen-
dant. Judge Leverich could not be acting as a city judge 
nor justice of the peace as neither of these offices have 
any jurisdiction of felonies, except that a city judge or 
a justice of the peace may by virtue of his office be a 
committing magistrate and conduct the preliminary 
hearing of a defendant charged with a felony. In the 
capacity of committing magistrate, he would not be act-
ing as a judge of the city court or as a justice of the 
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peace of a justice's court, but a committing magistrate. 
This is obvious when we consider that Section 105-10-5 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, provides that the follow-
ing persons may be magistrates: 
(1) Justices of the Supreme Court 
(2) Judges of the district courts 
(3) Judges of city courts 
( 4) Justices of the peace 
Certainly no one can say that a justice of the Supreme 
Court, acting as a committing magistrate in a prelimin-
ary hearing, is functioning as the Supreme Court. Like-
wise, a judge of the District Court acting as a commit-
ting magistrate does not function as a District Court. 
It naturally follows that a judge of a city court or a 
justice of the peace acting as a committing magistrate, 
does not function as a city court or a justice's court. 
As to plaintiff's contention that a committing mag-
istrate is a non-judicial officer and that his function is 
ministerial and not judicial, see the following author-
ities: 
16 Corpus Juris 319, paragraph 568: 
"THE POWER TO EXAMINE AND TO 
COMMIT PERSONS CHARGED WITH CRIME 
IS NOT JUDICIAL BUT IS ONE OF THE 
DUTIES OF THE CONSERVATORS OF THE 
PEACE, AND IT MAY BE, AND USUALLY 
IS, VESTED IN PERSONS OTHER THAN 
COURTS, AS FOR INSTANCE, JUSTICES OF 
THE PEACE OR POLICE MAGISTRATES, 
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OR PERSONS EXERCISING JURISDICTION 
ANALOGOUS TO THAT EXERCISED BY 
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, OR WHO ARE 
EX OFFICIO JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, 
SUCH AS MAYORS, NOTARIES PUBLIC, OR 
COURT COMMISSIONERS. Power to hold 
preliminary examinations may be exercised by 
United States Commissioners, and United States 
district judges, who, while taking the prelimin-
ary examination, exercise the powers of commis-
sioners only. Where the examination is trans-
ferred by the commissioner before whom the war-
rant .is returnable to another commissioner in the 
same district, the latter has jurisdiction to take 
the examination and to commit defendant, if the 
charge is sustained.'' (See cases therein cited.) 
16 Corpus Juris, page 320, paragraph 569: 
"In some states, by statute, power to conduct 
preliminary examinations is conferred upon 
judges of the higher courts. IT HAS BEEN 
HELD THAT, WITHOUT REGARD TO THE 
POvVERS PERTAINING TO HIS JUDICIAL 
OFFICE, A JUDGE WHEN EXERCISING 
THE .B"'UNCTIONS OF A MAGISTRATE IN 
CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY EXAMINA-
TION HAS ONLY THE JURISDICTION AND 
POWER CONFERRED BY LAW UPON MAG-
ISTRATES." 
People vs. Cohen, 118 Cal. 7 4, 50 Pac. 20: 
''A superior judge, when sitting as a magis-
trate, possesses no other or greater powers than 
are possessed by any other officer exercising the 
functions of a magistrate. The justices of this 
court, judges of the superior courts, justices of 
the peace and police magistrates in cities and 
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towns are each and all by the statute made magis-
trates. (Pen. Code, Sec. 808.) The office is pme-
ly a statutory one, and the powers and duties of 
the functionary are solely those given by the 
statute; and those powers are precisely the same 
whether exercised by virtue of one office, or that 
of another. The statute makes no sort of distinc-
tion between them. IF A JUDGE OF A SUPER-
IOR COURT, OH A JUSTICE OF THIS 
COURT, SEES FIT TO ASSUME THE DU-
TIES OF A COMMITTING MAGISTRATE-
DUTIES \VI--IICH ARE USUALLY PERFORM-
ED BY OTHERS-HE HAS NO GREATER 
AUTHORITY AS SUCH MAGISTRATE THAN 
THAT POSSESSED BY ANY JUSTICE OF 
THE PEACE OR POLICE JUDGE. (People vs. 
Crespi, 115 Cal. 50, 46 P. 863). HE IS NOT AC-
COMPANIED IN THE DISCHARGE OF 
THOSE FUNCTIONS BY ANY OF THE GEN-
ERAL OR IMPLIED PUWERS, NOR BY 
THOSE PRESUMPTIONS OF REGULARITY 
OF HIS PROCEEDINGS, WHICH SURROUND 
HIM \VHEN SITTING AS A JUDGE OF A 
COURT OF RECORD. AS SUCH MAGIS-
TRATE HE IS PURELY A CREATURE OF 
THE STATUTE. vVHILE SITTING AS Pl_ 
MAGISTRATE, THEN, A JUDGE OF THE 
SUPERIOR COURT WOULD HAVE NO MORE 
RIGHT TO CALL IN THE COUNTY CLERK 
OR ANY OTHER OFFICER TO ADMINISTER 
OATHS BEFORE HIM THAN ~WOULD A .JUS-
TICE OF THE PEACE OR POLICE .JUDGE. 
NOR WOULD THE COUNTY CLERK OR HIS 
DEPUTIES, ALTHOUGH GENERALLY AU-
THORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS, HAVE 
ANY MORE RIGHT TO PERFORM THAT 
FUNCTION BEFORE SUCH JUDGE SITTING 
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AS A MAGISTRATE THAN BEFORE A JUS-
TICE OF THE PEACE, NOR COULD THEY 
BE REQUIRED TO DO SO IN THE ONE IN-
STANCE MORE THAN THE OTHER." 
It is apparent that J. Allan Crockett in his affidavit 
attempts to set forth on information and belief, that R, 
Verne McCullough was guilty of contempt of the au-
thority of the city court of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, by disobedience and resistance to 
the executions of the lawful orders of the said city court 
of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
rendered by Judge B. P. Leverich in the contempt case, 
:3et forth that the contempt charged was the disobedience 
and resistance to the executions of the lawful orders of 
the City Court of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. Plaintiff contends that no lawful orders 
were ever, or could be made by the city court of Salt Lake 
City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in the matter per-
taining to the prosecution of Harry E. Erickson for the 
felonious crime of carnal knowledge; that if any lawful 
orders were made in said prosecution, the only person 
who could make them would be the committing magis-
trate. The fact that Judge B. P. Leverich had dual ca-
pacity to officiate as the judge of the city court of Salt 
Lake City or the justice of the peace of the justice's 
court of Salt Lake City Precinct, would not give any 
validity to orders of the said B. P. Leverich as city 
judge of the city court of Salt Lake City or justice of 
the peace of the justice's court of Salt Lake City Pre-
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cinct, effecting criminal proceedings for the prosecution 
of a felony before B. P. Leverich, committing magistrate. 
If this contention is correct, the only orders which R. 
Verne McCullough could be guilty of contempt in re-
sisting and disobeying in the prosecution of Harry E. 
Erickson, would be the valid orders issued by B. P. Lev-
erich, committing magistrate. Plaintiff contends that 
the entire contempt proceedings are erroneously based 
upon void orders of B. P. Leverich while acting as city 
judge of the city court of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. This is obvious for the reason 
that the city court of Salt Lake City did not and could 
not have jurisdiction of the prosecution of Harry E. 
Erickson for the felonious crime of carnal knowledge. 
PLAINTIFF CONTENDS THAT A COMMIT-
TING MAGISTRATE HAS NO POWER OR AU-
THORITY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH OR AT COMMON LAW TO FINE AND IM-
PRISON FOR CONTEMPT. 
See Farnham vs. Colman, 19 South Dakota 342. The 
Court quotes from In Re Mason (D. C.) 43 Fed. 510, as 
follows: 
"Although the Recorder of the City of Ho-
boken, New Jersey, had all the powers that jus-
tices of the peace throughout the state possessed 
as committing magistrates, the court, in discharg-
ing on habeas corpus a prisoner found_ guilty of 
contempt, employs the following langnagP: 
'' 'To punish by a commitment for contt-mpt 
is a power belonging only to judges of cPrtain 
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courts, and does not arise from the men~ exerciS(' 
of judicial functions. The power is gre1:1J and its 
exercise without review, where there i.o; jurisdic-
tion, and hence, our duty to be careful not to ex-
tend it beyond the recognized bounds of the com-
mon law. That power, as far as it may be exer-
cised by judicial officer, is an incident to a conrt 
belonging alike to courts of civil and criminal 
jurisdict:ion, but not extending at common law be-
low such as are courts of record recognized in 
the common law. The general doctrine of the 
English law is that all courts of record may fine 
or imprison for contempt in the face of the court. 
And as early as Griesley's case (8 Coke 38), it 
was resolved, in the Common Pleas, that courts 
which are not of record cannot impose a fine or 
commit any persons to prison for contempt. A 
power to fine or imprison in such cases, although 
necessary for the proper discharge of the duti\•s 
of a court not of an inferior jurisdiction, and for 
the maintenance of its independence and dignity, 
should not belong to all persons, bodies or trib-
unals who may have a judicial duty to perform. 
The Common law wisely did not recognize it in 
courts below those of record; and we shc,uld be 
doing violence to the liberty of the citizen to en-
courage its existence in any of our own cc.urtE', 
except that, in their very nature, or from analogy 
to their English models, or in their constitution, 
are courts of record, with jurisdictions not be-
neath the character of those so treated in the 
common law'." 
In the Farnham vs. Colman case, the court held that 
a United States Court Commissioner, sitting as a com-
mitting magistrate, had no power under the laws of 
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Minnesota, to punish a witness for contempt. Judge 
Nelson said: 
"It is claimed by counsel that the puwer to 
examine gives the right to subpoena witnesses, 
and, as an incident to it, the power to enforce 
obedience to the subpoena by arrest and punish-
ment for contempt. To arrest and punish for con-
tempt, is the highest exercise of judicial power 
and belongs to ju,dges of courts of record or SU'-
perior courts. Where jurisdiction exists there 
can be no review. A pardon by the executive is 
in most cases the mode of release. This power is 
not, and never has been an incident to the mere 
exercise of judicial function, and such power can-
not be upheld upon inference and implication, but 
must be expressly conferred by law. There is au-
thority of the courts of the United States directly 
upon the question. In Re Perkins, on habeas cor-
pus, before the circuit court, Judge Gresham, the 
particular question raised here was decided. Judge 
Gresham said: 
" 'It is a stretch of language to say that the 
punishment of a witness for contempt, and by a 
commissioner, is a necessary part of the usual 
mode of process against offenders or essential to 
the exercise of any powers conferred on him by 
the Federal law'." 
In the matter of George N. Farnham, 8 Michigan 89, 
the Court held the authority to commit for contempt is 
not an authority or power incident to the office of the 
committing magistrate, or to the authority otherwise 
conferred upon the justice of the peace in that capacity. 
He has only such powers as are expressly conferred. 
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In the matter of Peter Kerrigan on Habeas Corpus, 
33 New Jersey Law, 344, the court held: 
''Magistrates and others, empo·wered to fine 
and imprison in a summary way, are judges of 
record quo ad hoc, and their judgments and con-
victions should be recorded. Such recording may 
have the conclusive effect of protecting them in 
their judicial action, but will not raise these trib-
unals to the dignity of common law courts of 
record.'' 
The Court said on page 349: 
''The powers of the Justice of the Peace were 
orig.inally ministerial entirely (Schroeder vs. Eh-
lers, 2 Vroom 145), consisting chiefly in preserv-
ing the peace, receiving complaints, issuing sum-
mons or warrants, taking the examination of wit-
nesses and of the informant, binding them over, 
and bailing or committing the accused, 5 Black 
354. In the discharge of all his ministerial duties 
I can find no English case that directly establishes 
a right to punish for contempt.'' 
In the Whitcomb case, 120 Mass. 118, 21 Am. Rep. 
502, the Court held: 
"The power to punish for contempt is un-
doubtedly a judicial power, and therefore stat-
utes undertaking to vest it in tribunals which 
are not judicial, must be unconstitutional." 
See Haugley vs. Ryan, 182 Mo. 349; 81 S. W. 435. 
Sec. 104-78-1 to 104-78-5, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, define con tempts in justice's courts. 
Sec. 104-45-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, enum-
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erates acts and omissions constituting contempts in the 
District Court. 
Sec. 20-4-29, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, pro-
vides that: 
''In all. criminal trials and proceedings in 
the city courts, the procedure and practice shall 
conform as nearly as may be to that prescribed 
by law for justice's courts." 
In no place in the Utah Statute is authority given to 
a committing magistrate to fine and punish for contempt. 
At common law a magistrate had no such authority, and 
therefore, plaintiff contends that he could not be guilty 
of contempt of any order of B. P. Leverich acting as a 
committing magistrate, and any contempt proceedings 
arising out of the alleged violation of the orders of said 
magistrate would be a mere nullity. 
It is a well established doctrine of the law that the 
crime of perjury cannot be committed before a court or 
tribunal which is act~ng without jurisdiction. An exam-
ination of the authorities confirms us in this view. That 
queston is annotated at considerable length in 82 L.R.A., 
page 1127. 
At page 1128 of that report it is said: 
"It is a well established general rule that 
perjury cannot be charged on a false oath in a 
proceeding before a court which had no juris-
diction to inquire into the matter which is the 
subject of that proceeding.'' 
In support of the rule, cas~s are cited from the Su-
preme Court of the United States, the District of Co-
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lumbia, Hawaii, England, Canada, and twenty-four states 
of the Union. In the absence of statute we have been 
unable to find a case to the contrary. At the time the 
alleged offense of perjury was committed, our statute 
touching the crime of perjury provided: 
"Every person, who having taken an oath 
that he will testify, declare, depose and certify 
truly before any competent tribunal, officer or 
person in any of the cases in which such an oath 
may by law be administered, wilfully, contrary to 
such oath, states as true any material he knows 
to be false, is guilty of perjury.'' Revised Stat-
utes of Utah, 1933, Section 103-43-1. 
That provision is merely declaratory of the common law. 
If a court is without jurisdiction of a cause, no evidence 
can be material and therefore the contempt proceedings 
were a mere nullity. A case or two which are typical of 
all the cases, will illustrate the view entertained by the 
courts: 
In the case of United States vs. Jackson, 20 D. C. 
424, it is said: 
"We think it is very well settled, the author-
itlies seeming to be uniform upon that point, that 
when perjury is assigned to have been committed 
in a cause of a trial in any court, that the court 
in which the trial is held where the perjury is al-
leged to have been committed, must have juris-
clliction of the action or prosecution in which the 
oath was taken, and that unless the Court had 
jurisdiction to try and dispose of the case, per-
jury cannot be assigned.'' 
136 
In the case of McClannohan vs. Conn, 11 Kentucky 
Appeals, 72, it is said: 
"The administration of an oath in a case 
over which the court has no jurisdiction is \~ke 
every other part of the proceedings, a mere nul-
lity, the judge having no more power to admin-
ister than he would on the street where no pur-
pose was to be accomplished by it nor any oath 
required.'' 
Such are the authorities generally. 
Plaintiff further contends that the affidavit of J. 
Allan Crockett, filed in the contempt proceedings, is 
fatally defective and did not give the court jurisdiction 
in said cause. The affidavit of said J. Allan Crockett 
is based entirely upon information and belief. Plaintiff 
contends that in a case of constructive contempt a court 
cannot proceed except by an accusation in writing set-
ting forth the facts constituting the contempt in a pos-
itive manner by someone conversant therewith; that the 
jurisdiction of the court is predicated upon such an af-
fidavit. The following authorities are in point that the 
insufficiency of the affidavit is jurisdictional and not 
mere error: 
Nichols vs. State (Okl), 129 Pac. 673: 
''The Court not having any personal know-
ledge of the facts, cannot proceed except by an 
accusa~'ion in writing under oath, specifically 
charging the facts constituting the violation.'' 
Phillips Sheet and Tin Plate Co. vs. Workers, 208 
Fed. 335, at page 344: 
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"The charging paper (petition, motion or 
affidavit), on a proceeding for contempt must 
not be defective in substance but must show on 
its face, sufficient facts to const.itute a contempt 
and to justify the relief sought and must also 
have an appropriate prayer, and the defects in 
such respects are jurisdictional and not waived 
by the accused by going to trial without objec-
tion." 
Mitchell vs. Superior Court, 125 Pac. 1061 at 1062; 
163 Cal. 423: 
''The affidavit or affidavits upon which a 
contempt proceeding is based, constitute the com-
plaint; and, unless they upon their face, charge 
acts constituting contempt, the court is without 
jurisdiction to proceed.'' · 
Hutton vs. Superior Court, 81 Pac. 409; 147 Cal. 159: 
"Where a contempt ;is committed without the 
presence of the court, the affidavit of facts con-
stituting the complaint, is insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction on the court to punish the defendant 
unless it shows a case of contempt on ~ts face. 
Writ of certiorari will lie to test jurisdict'ion." 
Coulter vs. People, 53 California, 123 Pac. 647: 
"If the affidavit upon which proceedings to 
punish for contempt are based fails to allege facts 
which, if true, constitute a contempt, jurisdiction 
is not acquired." 
Rapalje on Con tempts, Section 94: 
"It is elementary that if the affidavit or 
complaint upon which contempt proceedings are 
based, is defective in substance, that is, fails to 
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allege facts which, if true, will constitute con-
tempt in law, the court will not acquire jurisdic-
tion, and if the court proceeds, its judgment will 
be reversed.'' 
In the case of Emeline A. Young et al vs. George 
Q. Cannon et al., 2 Utah, page 560, the Court held: In 
all proceedings for contempt, which are not committed 
in the presence of the Court, in order to give the Court 
jurisdiction, it is necessary that an affidavit be filed, 
stating the facts constituting the contempt. The Court 
said on page 594 : 
"It will not do to state in the affidavit in 
general terms a conclusion of law, that the party 
has been gu':ilty of a disobedience to the order of 
the court, or be in such indefinite form as not to 
show a particular or a series of particular dis-
obediences. It must state the particular act or 
acts of disobedience, and in such clear and un-
mistakable language that will give to the court 
knowledge in what particular or particulars its 
order has been disobeyed; that a demand has 
been formally made to obey the order in the par-
ticular set out in the affidavit, and that the con-
temnor either refused and declined, or wilfully, 
and still does, continue to disobey the order. Un-
less this particularity is observed in the affidavit, 
the court cannot become possessed of the facts 
constituting the contempt and showing that its 
order has been disobeyed, and the accused will 
not be informed of the act or charge to which he 
is called upon to answer. No man can b~ deprived 
of his liberty or have his property wrested from 
him without due process of law, and the court 
cannot derive that jurisdiction over the matter, 
139 
which it is necessary for it to have to enforce its 
orders, without the law has been complied with 
strictly and in the manner pointed out by the 
statute." 
PLAINTIFF CONTENDS THAT AN AFFIDA-
VIT ON INFORMATION AND BELIEF IS OF NO 
VALUE WHATSOEVER AND CITES THE FOL-
LOWING AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF HIS 
CONTENTION: 
6 Ruling Case Law, page 532, cites the general rule: 
"While an instance is given where an accu-
sation was deemed sufficient, though only on in-
formation and belief (Emery vs. State (Neb.) 
111 N. W. 374), IT IS THE RULE IN MOST 
JURISDICTIONS THAT SUCH AN AFFIDA-
VIT IS -WHOLLY INSUFFICIENT UPON 
-WHICH TO BASE CONSTRUCTIVE CON-
TEMPT PROCEEDINGS AND THAT NO JUR-
ISDICTION CAN BE ACQUIRED BY THE 
COURT THEREUNDER.'' 
Plaintiff contends that the Nebraska case of Emery 
vs. State, cited by the author of Ruling Case Law as an 
exception to the general rule, does not support the ex-
ception for the reason that the Court held on page 374 
.in Volume 111 of the Northwestern Reporter, that the 
charge of contempt was set forth in positive and direct 
terms but that the prosecutor in his verification stated 
that the allegations and charges contained in said infor-
mation were within his information, and that he verily 
believed them to be true. The Court held that such de-
fect in the verification of the information was waived by 
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the filing of the answer and entering a plea of not guilty 
and proceeding to trial. 
Belangee vs. State, (Neb.) 149 N. W. 415: 
''An affidavit alleging material facts on in-
formation and belief does not give a court juris-
diction of a contempt proceeding.'' 
Hurdman vs. State, 54 Neb. 626: 
"The affidavit in contempt proceedings is 
jurisdictional. The statement must be of the per-
sonal knowledge of the affiant. It may not be on 
information and belief.'' 
Ex parte Fullen, 17 N. M. 394; 128 Pac. 64: 
''A constructive contempt must be brought 
to the court's notice by affidavit. This affidavit 
must state facts which if established, would con-
stitute a contempt; and if it does not do so, the 
court is without jurisdiction to proceed.'' 
This case arose on a writ of habeas corpus and the 
judge delivering the opinion of the Court said: 
''The overwhelming weight of authority in 
this country sustains the proposition that the af-
fidavit upon which the proceeding for a construc-
tive contempt is based, must state facts, which, if 
established, would constitute the offense, and if 
the allegations of the affidavit are not sufficient 
in this respect, the court is without jurisdiction 
to proceed.'' 
State vs. Sweetland, 3 S.D. 503; 54 N. W. 415: 
''In a proceeding for constructive contempt, 
the affidavit on which the proceeding is based, 
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is jurisdictional and all the facts showing that 
the case is one over which the court has jurisdic-
tion, must be made to affirmatively appear by 
the affidavit.'' 
Early vs. People, 117 Ill. App. 608: 
''A petition filed in a contempt proceeding 
should be certain in every essential particular 
and should show facts which, if proven, will es-
tablish the contempt alleged, and where based 
merely upon the belief of the petitioner, it is in-
sufficient.'' 
State vs. Gallup, 1 Kans. App. 618; 42 Pac. 406: 
"An affidavit which only states that infor-
matiton has come to the county attorney that a 
person has committed a contempt, is fatally de-
fective.'' 
Russell vs. Mandell, Circuit Judge, 136 Mich. 624; 
99 N. W. 864: 
"Allegations in the petition not supported 
by the affidavits will be ignored. When one 
charges another with the serious crime of inter-
fering with the due course of justice by corrupt-
ing or intimidating witnesses, he must have posi-
tive evidence to present to the court upon which 
to base the charge. Rumors will not do. Allega-
tions upon information and belief are not suffi-
cient to put the party charged upon answer." 
(Case arose on writ of mandamus.) 
State vs. Newton, 16 North Dakota 151; 14 Am. and 
English Annotated Cases 1035: 
"An affidavit upon information and belief 
is insufficient as a basis for constructive con-
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tempt proceedings, and under such an affidavit 
the court acquires no jurisdiction to issue an at-
tachment for contempt." 
See Note in 14 Am. and Eng. Ann. Cases 1042: 
"In a majority of jurisdictions, the affidavit 
filed as the basis of a proceeding to punish for a 
contempt not committed in the presence of the 
court, must stat.e positive knowledge. If upon in-
formation and belief, insufficient." (See cases 
cited therein.) 
Ludden vs. State, 48 N. W. 61 (Nebraska): 
"The charge must be direct, that the party 
has committed the act complained of. In all mat-
ters based upon the oath of a party charging an-
other with the commission of an offense, by 
which he may be deprived of his liberty, the 
charge must be specific and direct, mere hearsay 
will not do.'' 
St. Amant vs. Beixcodin, 5 N. Y. Super. 703. 
State vs. Newton, 112 N. W. 52, (North Dakota): 
"In constructive criminal contempt proceed-
ings, a formal accusation is essential, and such 
accusation takes the place of an indictment or in-
formation in a criminal case, and must be tested 
by the same rules applicable to indictments and 
informations.'' 
''We take it to be equally well settled that 
such an accusation must state the facts tending 
to show the defendant's guilt, by positive aver-
ments, and that a statement of such facts on in-
formation and belief, renders such accusations a 
mere nullity, and confers no jurisdiction upon the 
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court to entertain the contempt proceedings or to 
r·ender judgment therein." 
State vs. Conn, 62 Pac. 289 (Oregon): 
"The facts constituting the contempt shall be 
stated in a positive manner by someone conver-
sant therewith. Indeed, a proper regard for the 
liberty of the citizen forbids any proceeding by 
which he nwy be deprived of his liberty without 
the iuforrnation f~trnished by such an affidavit." 
Freedman vs. Huron, 66 N. W. 928, (South Dakota): 
''Persons Rhould not be required to accept 
an essentially criminal charge based merely upon 
tlH~ belief of a prosecutor." 
Ex parte Landry, 144 S. \V. 962 (Texas). 
JUDGE B. P. LEVERICH ACTING AS COMMIT-
TING MAGISTRATE IN THE PROSECUTION OF 
THE CRIMINAL CASE OF THE" STATE OF UTAH 
VS. HARRY E. ERICKSON," \VAS BOUND BY LA ·w 
TO DISMISS SAID ACTION WHEN THE COUNTY 
ATTORNEY MADE A MOTION THAT THE ACTION 
BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE AS 
SHO\VN BY THE COURT RECORDS IN SAID AC-
TION AND BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
JUDGMENT RENDERED IN THE CONTEMPT PRO-
CEEDINGS AGAINST R. VERNE McCULLOUGH. 
Plaintiff contends that Judge B. P. Leverich had 
no right to refuse to dismiss the case when the motion 
to dismiss was made by the prosecuting officer. This 
doctrine is clearly established in the common law and 
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in absence of statutory authority giving the committing 
magistrate discretionary power in such matters, the 
motion to dismiss on the part of the prosecuting officer 
ended the case. The follovYing authorities are in point: 
"The weight of authnrity is to the effeet 
that, in the absenec of a statute on the subject, 
the entering of a nolle prosequi bc~fore the jury 
have been impaneled and sworn lies in the sole 
discretion of the pro scenting officer.'' 
22 R. C. L. 97 
16 c. J. 432. 
"Publie prosecutions, until they eoPw lwfore 
the court to which they are returnable, are within 
the exchtsive direction of the district attorucy and 
even after they are entered in court, they are so 
far under his control that he 1nay enter a nolle 
prosequi at any time before the :i1try is impaneled 
for the trial of the case except 'in cases 1.uhere it 
is otherwise provided in some act of Conr;ress . .. 
Under the rules of the eonnnon laY·.', it must be 
conceded that the prosecuting party may rdi:1-
quish his suit at any stage or it, and withdraw 
from court at his option, and without otlwr lia-
bility to his adversary than the paynwnt of tax-
able costs whieh have acerued up to the time 
when he withdraws his suit.'' 
Confiseation cases. 
19 U. S. (L. Ed.) 19G. 
In prosecution for perjury it must appear that the 
alleged false testimony was on a material point. 
Obviously no testimony could be material unless 
some issue was then properly before the Court. 
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Committing Magistrate D. P. Leverich ·was, upon 
motion of the County Attorney, bound to dismiss the 
criminal prosecution of Erickson. Under the maxim that 
equity considers that as done which ought to be done, 
the motion to dismiss virtually did away w:ith the crim-
inal prosecution of Erickson. 
That being so, defendant could not properly be cited 
before the Court on a contempt proceedin,g for things 
which occurred after the motion to dismiss was made; 
it would necessarily follow, for that reason, that what-
ever testimony the defendant gave in the contempt pro-
CPedings could not be material because no matter was 
then pending "before any competent tribunal," as pro-
vided by the definition of perjury. (See. 103-43-1, Revis-
ed Statutes of Utah, 1933). 
In f'onclusion, plaintiff makes no appeal for any un-
merited ::;ympathy from your Honorable Court. For two 
years :M eCnllough has face.d charge after charge before 
committing magistrates, courts and commissions. Evi-
dence, requiring over 2500 pages of transcript, has been 
g~1then~d throughout the United States. Thousands of 
dollars have been spent hy plaintiff for transcripts, vvit-
nPss fees and eourt (~Xpcnscs. Newspapers throughout 
the State of Utah and adjoining states, including the 
Utah State Bar Bulletin, have lmmereifully publicized 
these procceuinr;~;. 1lcCullonr;h 's law practice has been 
irreparably ruirwd. He is fighting for a final vindica-
tion of his standing as a la-wyer before your Honorable 
Court and as a eitizen of the State of Utah. 
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vV e sincerely concur in the following statement of 
Bakewell, Justice of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in 
State vs. Laughl:in, 10 Mo. App. loc. cit. 6, cited by ~Weeks 
on Attorneys at Law, Sec. 80, page 140: 
"The power to disbar an attorney ought to 
be exercised with the greatest caution, not as a 
means of punishment, and only in extreme cases; 
for the decision of a court disbarring one of its 
attorneys must have the most dreadful effect up-
on the social standing and future position of the 
unhappy man disbarred. The power should only 
be exerc.ised where the delinquent has shown him-
self utterly unfit to be a member of an honorable 
profession and an officer of the court.'' 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. VERNE McCULLOUGH, 
Plaintiff, 
ELIAS HANSEN, 
HENRY D. MOYLE, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
